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Introduction: The Stalin note and the 
.. lost-opportunity debate .. 
On 10 March 1952, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko 
summoned representatives from the French, British and American embas-
sies in Moscow and handed them identical notes. This document, which 
later became known as the Stalin note, suggested that the German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany should unite 
in an "independent democratic peace-loving state". The occupation powers 
should withdraw all troops from Germany and dismantle their military 
bases no later than one year after the peace treaty had been signed. 1 
Seemingly, Moscow would allow Germany a liberal democracy. All 
persons under German jurisdiction, irrespective of race, sex, language or 
religion should enjoy "the rights of man and the fundamental freedoms, 
including freedom of speech, press, religion, political conviction and 
assembly". There would be "no kind of limitations" on the German "peace-
ful economy". The country could trade with all nations, enjoy free access 
to the world markets and employ land, air and sea forces "essential for the 
defence of the country" .2 
The Stalin note placed only four restraints on Germany. The country could 
not "enter into any coalition or military alliance whatsoever directed against 
any power which has taken part with armed forces in the war against Ger-
many". The unified state could not produce"war materials" in excess ofher 
own needs. Furthermore, all signatories of the peace treaty had to acceptthe 
"borders established by the Potsdam Conference". That is, Germany could not 
claim back the Polish territories east ofthe Oder-Neisse line. Finally, 
Germany should not grant political rights to convicted war criminals or allow 
"organisationshostileto democracy and the cause ofmaintainingpeace".' 
The Stalin note struck a chord in the Federal Republic. It promised 
national unity as an alternative to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's policy of 
integration with the West. Integration was controversial in the early 1950s 
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and faced opposition from, among others, Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the 
social Democratic Party (SPD). Schumacherdetested integration and 
considered it a national self-denial.' 
years after the Stalin note was sent, the note continued to stir a contro-
versy between those who had thought unification possible on acceptable 
terms and those who defended Adenauer's policy of alignment with the 
United States. On 23 January 1958, for example, when two members of 
Adenauer's 1952 cabinet debated the note at a Bundestag session, Bonn 
witnessed " .. .the most passionate and vehement debate the parliament had 
yet experienced".' 
Due to the controversy it caused, an astonishing number of books and 
articles has debated the Stalin note.' Most of this literature, however, has 
used American and German assessments to substitute for Soviet sources. 
When RolfSteininger, for example, assumed that Stalin offered unification 
and liberal democracy, he cited the opinion of Western hard-liners who 
feared Stalin was becoming dangerously reasonable. 7 Alas, contemporary 
Western observers had widely different opinions about the Stalin note. 
Hermann Gram!, like Steininger, explains Soviet motives by citing the view 
of contemporary observers - but Gram!' s sources believed the Stalin note 
was propagandistic.' 
The German academic debate about the Stalin note began in 1956, 
when Paul Sethe, a former co-editor of the FrankfUrter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, published his book Zwischen Bonn und Moskau (Between Bonn 
and Moscow). Sethe forcefully argued that Stalin had offered a democratic 
German reunification back in 1952. This stand has since become known as 
the lost opportunity thesis.' 
Unlike Sethe, who thought a united Germanywouldremain democratic, 
some historians think Stalin planned to unite Germany but somehow 
include the country in the Eastern Bloc. To support this view, they claim 
Stalin was unable to perceive non-alignment, but rather saw a world 
divided in two irreconcilable camps according to the schemeAndrei Zhdanov 
had outlined in 1947 atthe foundingassemblyofthe Cominform. If we 
interpretZhdanov narrowly, there is no such thing as non-alignmentin the 
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struggle between socialism and capitalism, and a united Gennanywould 
belong in one camp or the other. Hence, it would not make sense for Stalin to 
unite the country unless he foresaw a socialist Gennany. 10 For lack of a better 
name, we may call this theory the trap thesis. 
Some researchers believe the Stalin note was written, not to advance 
the Soviet position in West Gennany, but to secure the Soviet hold in East 
Gennany. The legitimacy of East Berlin was threatened by the powerful 
idea that all Gennans should belong to one nation state. Only if the great 
powers made the division of Gennany pennanent, could the Gennan 
Communists concentrate on building their own state. If, however,. the 
Soviet Union was seen to divide Gennany, Moscow would compromise the 
national credentials of the Gennan Communists and further weaken the 
legitimacy of the East Gennan regime. Some researchers see the Stalin 
note as an attempt to solve this dilemma. If Stalin was convinced the 
Western powers would object to a united but non-aligned Gennany, he 
could safely propose Gennan unity and expect the Western powers to 
reject the idea. The foreseen Western rejection would give the Soviet Union 
a proper excuse for building a separate East Gennan state. We may call this 
point of view the alibi thesis. 11 
A fourth group, possibly the largest, argues that the Stalin note aimed, 
not to unite Gennany under any condition, but to make people believe 
Gennan unification was possible and imminent. While feeding the Gennan 
desire for unification, Moscow would, as a side effect, create a popular 
sentiment against any move that could impede a united Gennany - particu-
larly West Gennan membership in the Western alliance." Adherents to the 
propaganda thesis claim the Stalin note was propaganda in the shape of a 
diplomatic note. 
The latest supporter of the propaganda school is Gerhard Wettig. Wettig 
was the first researcher to examine the Stalin note by use of Russian 
archival sources." He argues that the Stalin note aimed to cause an up-
heaval in the Federal Republic; Stalin wanted to "mobilise the Gennan 
'masses' ... in an intense effort to oust Adenauer' s government and to force 
the Western powers out ofGennany" .14 Several historians and fonner 
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politicianshave supported Wettig, includingArnulfBaring, Alexander Fischer 
and Hennann Gram!." 
Regardless ofWettig's attempt to examine the background of the Stalin 
note in Soviet archives, the debate continues. Historians Jochen Laufer and 
Elke Scherstjanoi have criticised Wettig's study in the journal Deutschland 
Archiv. 16 The critics centre on three topics. First, several passages in 
Wettig's study resemble an attempt to collect ammunition for an old 
Gennan controversy - in the words of Laufer - "a continuation of the cold 
war with other means"." Scherstjanoi claims that Wettig uses ambiguous 
tenns like "struggle for unity" as unambiguous evidence of an offensive 
Communist strategy. Second, the critics remark that Wettig has based his 
study on a narrow foundation- just two files in the Foreign Policy Ar-
chives of the Russian Federation. Third, the critics point out that Wettig 
applies a totalitarian model, sometimes taking for granted that the view of a 
bureaucrat reflects the view of Stalin himself and that the goals were 
identical in East Berlin and in Moscow. 
The goal of this study is to recapitulate Soviet policy towards Gennany 
in a fairly broad manner. Apart from a brief glance at the pre-history of 
occupied Gennany, we shall also examine Soviet perceptions of the devel-
opment in Gennany. Hopefully, this background will add to our under-
standing as we examine the various and sometimes conflicting Soviet 
policies. At times, Moscow demanded a status quo in Gennany and at-
tempted to rally the Gennans in support of Soviet goals; at times, Moscow 
considered negotiations with the Western powers. Although we will never 
know for sure what the outcome of such negotiations could have been, we 
may at least establish that part of the Soviet policy-making establishment 
tinkered with the idea of a united Gennany, not Sovietised, but with strictly 
limited freedoms of action. 
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Two lines in Soviet policy towards 
Germany, 1945-1950 
Soviet policy towards Germany was not coherent in the early years after the 
war. A !times, the Soviet policy favoured unification and a single German 
state; at times, the Soviet occupation policy in effect deepened the division of 
the country. Frequently, the two lines collided, butthey continued to co-exist. 
Even as the two German states were established in I 949, and Moscow 
supported the German Democratic Republic, the forces that favoured 
unification were still at work. 
The legacy of Potsdam 
Atthe outset, Soviet policy was clearly to keep Germany united. In July-
August I 945 the Big Three met in Potsdam, outside Berlin, and agreed on a 
set of common principles to guide the occupation of Germany until a peace 
treaty could be signed with "a government suitable" for that purpose. 18 
Although the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union agreed that 
Germany should stay united, they divided the country into occupation 
zones for reasons of administrative convenience. The great powers agreed 
to treat Germany as one economic entity and to establish German political 
and administrative institutions. The plan was to establish municipal admin-
istration first. Later, when the occupation had uprooted Nazism, Germany 
should be granted a central government. 19 
Stalin had a number of reasons to support German unity. Like his allies, 
he knew the lesson of Versailles and hoped to avoid a political fragmenta-
tion that could provoke a future national resurgence. Second, a division of 
Germany would deny Moscow access to war reparations from the industr-
ialised Western parts of Germany. Not only were the Western zones richer 
than the agrarian area east of the Elbe, but reparations from the Western 
12 DEFENCE STUDIES 111998 
zones would also mean dismantlingthe Ruhr industries and Germany's 
capacity to produce arms. Finally, Stalin needed Germany to stay united in 
order to allow Soviet influence in the Western zones. A say in the running of 
the territories west of the El be was desirable, ifnotto spread Communism, 
then at least to check on the Western powers and prevent them from using the 
German resources in a campaign against the Soviet Union.20 
Stalin allowed a number of political parties in the Soviet Zone of Occu-
pation. Already in July I 945, the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) and the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) put down roots in the zone. These 
parties were initially independent of the occupation power.'1 The Soviet and 
the Western zones of occupation adopted a fairly similar structure of local 
government in I 945 and I 946. 
In the early post-war years, France, not the Soviet Union, was the 
power most hostile to German unity. The French joined the Potsdam 
regime after the Potsdam Conference. Upon entering, Paris received an 
occupation zone in Germany and a voice in the Council of Foreign Minis-
ters (CFM) - a permanent body set up at the Potsdam conference. A 
central task of the Council was to elaborate peace treaties with conquered 
enemies such as Italy, Finland, Austria, Japan and Germany. At the first 
(September I 945) and second (April-July I 946) CFM sessions, the French 
government proposed to partition Germany. Soviet Foreign Minister 
Viacheslav Molotov rejected the French proposals.22 
Although relations between the Allies rapidly detoriated during I 946 and 
1947, Moscow nevertheless hoped to continue co-operating with the West 
on Germany. When a group of East German Communists visited Moscow 
in January-February I 947, Stalin and Molotov objected to the establishment 
of a central administration in Eastern Germany unless "the [Western] 
partners refuse to create a Central government or a Central administration 
for Germany"." At the London CFM session in December 1947, Molotov 
pushed for a peace treaty, but in vain. After the Council meeting, he 
accused the Western powers of sabotage." 
On 24 June I 948, the Soviet occupation authorities blocked all land routes 
between Berlin and Western Germany while insisting that the French, British 
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and American sectors ofthe city accept the monetary regime of the Soviet 
Zone. Moscow soughtto force the Western powers to accept negotiations 
over Germany or else abandon Berlin." 
The Berlin blockade did not mean the Soviet Union had settled for a 
division of Germany' At the onset of the Berlin crisis, a report to the 
Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party harshly criticised the 
ongoing Sovietisation in the Zone of Occupation, claiming that it imperilled 
Moscow's long-term interests in Germany. According to Norman Naimark, 
"a very strong current of opinion in the Central Committee" favoured a deal 
with the Western powers on Germany.26 Stalin remained reluctant to 
establish a separate administration in the Soviet Zone of Occupation. In 
December 1948, the Soviet dictator again restrained an East German 
proposal to build a Communist state East of Elbe. 27 
The Berlin blockade hardened the Western decision to set up a separate 
German state in the Western zones of occupation. The American response 
was decisive, the Western powers managed to supply West Berlin through 
an air-lift, and the anti-Communist sentiments grew in Western Germany." 
Stalin, as a matter offact , helped Adenauer win the West German elections in 
1949. 
The establishment of an East German police state 
Whereas a lot of historical evidence points to the conclusion that Stalin hoped 
to keep Germany united, the actual Soviet policies on the ground in East 
Germany frequently added to the division of the country. Two recent books, 
The Russians in Germany by Norman Naimarkand Stalins ungeliebtesKind by 
Wilfried Loth, confirm the great uncertainty that surrounded Soviet policy-
making in Germany. A group ofSoviet and German Communists looked for 
ever new opportunities to build a strong East German state and fight 
capitalism. Loth even argues that these zealots, particularly SED General 
Secretary Waiter Ulbricht, managed to build an East German state in conflict 
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with Stalin's wishes. Naimark' s is the safer bet- he believes that Stalin 
"allowed a variety of Soviet policies to be followed". 29 
Stalin was everywhere and nowhere. Most ofthe time he stayed in the 
background, sometimes he cracked down on this or the other development. 
But even when the dictator intervened directly, his signals were so vague that 
his subordinates could not establish a clear framework for action in Germany. 
Due to the lack of clear directions, much was left undecided. In the resulting 
power vacuum, people far below the ranks of the Politburo had to interpret the 
unclear directions and implement a policy. Naimarkshows how Colonel 
Sergei Tiulpanovat the Soviet Military Administrationin Germany moved to 
secure for the East German Communists a dominant role in the Soviet Zone 
of Occupation. The Colonel, who headed the Propagandaand Censorship 
Department,30 seized upon the confusion in the Soviet occupation policy. In 
1946, he spearheaded the creation of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) by 
forcefully uniting the Communists and the Social Democrats in the Zone. 
Whatthe SED failed to accomplish in elections, Tiulpanovprovidedthrough 
pressures and manipulation. Gradually, he introduced a political system that 
resembled his native Leningrad.31 
Not only did Tiulpanov and the East German Communists suppress 
political opposition, they moved on to Sovietise the SED itself. In the fall of 
1948, the SED proclaimed to be a "party of the new type" which in effect 
meant that the party recognised the Soviet Union as a model for its policy." 
Meanwhile, the role of the East German "bourgeois" parties steadily 
diminished. In the run up to the GDR general elections in the fall 1950, the 
SED regime let the state security service quell all outspoken opposition. 33 
The Sovietisation of East German politics coincided with a large-scale 
economic exploitation of the country. Moscow's quest for war reparations 
added to the division of the country because it contradicted the American 
policies in Germany. Whereas the Soviet Union hurried to remove property 
and resources, the American administration came about to support a 
German economic recovery that could bolster a wider West European 
recovery. Washington, however, was unwilling to pour Marshall aid and 
resources into West Germany only to see them disappear out of East 
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Gennany in the shape of Soviet war reparations. Thus, in June 1948, the 
Western powers introduced a new currency in their zones of occupation and 
created a separate West Gennan economy." 
The lack of competent Gennan speaking cadres forced the Soviet 
occupation authorities to let the Gennans administer themselves. Likewise, 
the management of the zone's economy gave an impetus to set up a 
separate East Gennan administration. On 20 March 1948, the Soviet 
Military Administration authorised the [East] Gennan Economic Commis-
sion to issue binding decrees, which in turn allowed the Commission to act 
almost as a cabinet." Gradually, a separate administration evolved, and, 
with time, it also developed a logic of its own." 
Finally, confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West elsewhere, in 
Korea, in the Middle East and in the Balkans, spilt over on the situation in 
Gennany. The climate of co-operation that once enabled the Potsdam 
agreement disappeared. The times favoured people like Ulbrichtwho hoped to 
build "socialism in half a country"." 
The nature of the GDR 
Stalin waited until the Federal Republic was established, and until Adenauer 
had taken office in Bonn, before he allowed the Gennan Democratic 
Republic (GDR) to be established on 7 October 1949.38 Although the GDR 
had the institutions of any sovereign state, Moscow kept unification as an 
option; East Gennan statehood was a hollow shell to be disposed of at 
Moscow's liking. 
Officially, Moscow assured everyone that the East Gennans were free to 
conduct their own business in every matter, save a few Soviet privileges like 
the right to secure reparations and the right to administer various four power 
agreements. In reality, however, there were few if any limits to Moscow's 
power. Wilfriede Otto has described the role of the Soviet Control Commis-
sion as a parallel cabinet (Nebenregierung) or even a super cabinet 
(Uberregierung)." Behind the scenes, Soviet diplomats admitted being "more 
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involved" in the running of the GDR than provided for by official 
understandings."" East Berlin had less room for manoeuvre than Warsaw and 
other Soviet satellites, and the freedoms granted to Poland or Bulgaria did not 
necessarily apply to East Berlin. Polish President Boleslaw Bierut, for 
example, was free to visit the GDR- but his Gennan colleague, Wilhelm 
Pieck, felt unable to receive him without a "correct evaluation" from 
Moscow.41 
Initially,East Berlin lacked even the semblance of a popular mandate. To 
avoid a devastating loss at the polls, the SED regime did not conduct 
elections upon the establishment of the GDR, but postponed the elections 
and let Stasi quell all outspoken opposition." When elections were arranged 
on 15 October 1950, East Berlin presented the voters with Hobson's 
choice: a single list of candidates, arranged to guarantee a SED-controlled 
majority in the People's Chamber." Frantic in its quest for legitimacy, the 
SED leadership then faked the results of the poll. The official figures held 
that fully 98.73 per cent of the East Gennans had turened out to vote-
99.72 per cent of the electorate allegedly accepted the Communist-control-
led unity list. 44 
The quest for legitimacy explains the East Gennan eagerness to participate 
in international political events. Since the United Nations and the Western 
powers did not recognise the GDR, the regime could only play a limited role 
on the international scene. The Gennan comrades tried to escape from 
isolation and gain recognition by taking a correspondingly active role in 
activities within the Soviet bloc. The initiative to arrange the conference of 
Soviet-bloc foreign ministers to protest aboutGennan rearmament was East 
Gennan." To enable the newly elected GDR governmentto participate in the 
confernce, Moscow decided to postphone the conference until the end of 
October 1950.46 
The Soviet foreign ministry carefully guarded the Soviet privileges in 
East Gennany and struck down on every East Gennan attempt to gain 
sovereignty. One such incident occurred in December 1951, when Ulbricht 
asked for a relaxation in the Soviet control on inter-Gennan trade arguing 
that increased trade could strengthen the East Gennan economy and place 
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unificationhigheron the public agenda in West Gennany.47 The Politburo 
declined; partly because,Moscow honoured the Potsdam regime on trade, 
partly because the Kremlin did not trust the Gennan comrades to conduct 
trade and border control. A Politburo memo argued that East Berlin might 
attempt to control the communication lines between West Berlin and the 
Federal Republic. This might provoke a dangerous incident since the 
"Western governments have located troops in Berlin"." As a rule of thumb, 
Moscow never allowed the SED a freedom unless Bonn had irreversibly 
received the privilege in question. 
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The Soviet idea of a Western conspiracy 
to exploit and militarise Germany 
As we approach 1950 and 1951, it became ever more evident that the 
Western powers intended to abandon the Potsdam regime and incorporate 
the Federal Republic in the Western alliance. Soviet reports on Gennany 
were coherent and equally pessimistic: the Western powers, primarily the 
United States, exploited Gennan manpower and resources to prepare 
aggression against the Soviet Union. The Soviet assessment of the develop-
ment was more alarming than a Western observer might expect. Not facts 
alone, but a powerful set of biases, helped to shape the image that Moscow 
received of Gennany. Thus, it is hard to overestimate the Soviet worries 
about Gennany. 
Sources of Soviet perceptions 
When Soviet observers explained what was happening in Gennany, they knew 
the answer in advance. The Party had adopted a view on the development in the 
Federal Republic, and the diplomats were unwise to question this Party line. 
Nevertheless, the existence of a Party line does not fully explain the cohesion 
in the Soviet reports on Gennany- we must also keep in mind the shared 
ideological training and the collective historical experience that shaped 
Moscow's view. Besides, knowing no other .frame of reference than Stalin's 
Russia, the Soviet diplomats applied to the Federal Republic the logic of a 
totalitarian state; West Gennany became the Soviet Union's mirror image-
equal but reverse. 
The intellectual frame of the Soviet diplomats wa.S shaped by Lenin's work 
on imperialism. During the First World Wf!I, Lenin wrote that capitalist 
monopolies within each state had mostly managed to kill off their domestic 
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competition. Thus, in each state, the government represented a united class of 
capitalists, no longer in conflict with each other, but in conflict with the ruling 
monopolies of other countries. Because of the uneven development in 
capitalist economies, some states would gain in strength relative to others. To 
offset the profitability crisis in their economies, these rising powers sought 
new markets and more raw materials. This expansive drive would temptthe 
stronger power to change the territorial status quo- a development that would 
inevitably result in war. Applying Lenin's theories on imperialism in the 
peaceful1920s, the Soviet diplomats predicted thatthe capitalist world would 
again experience crisis and war. Then came the crack ofl929, the great 
depressionofthe 1930s, Nazism and another war. The Soviet predictions from 
the 1920s had been stunningly accurate.Atthe onsetofthe Cold War, the 
Soviet diplomats deeply trusted their Leninisttool of analysis." 
Historical experience strongly coloured the Soviet judgement on West 
German affairs. The Great Patriotic War was a present memory for the 
Soviet observers, and they relentlessly compared developments in the 
Federal Republic with developments in Nazi Germany. Soviet diplomats 
were particularly worried about the German monopolies with their inherent 
potential to breed fascism and militarism, that is a set of ideals - aggres-
sive, efficient, disciplined, chauvinist and expansive - which predispose a 
nation to build, and use, large military forces. 
As if ideological training and historic experience did not provide Soviet 
diplomats with enough worrisome images of Germany, Moscow also 
ascribed to the country the logic of a totalitarian state. Soviet observers 
knew what role the Soviet occupation authorities played in East Germany, 
and they assumed the Western powers ruled the Federal Republic in much 
the same way. Although central planning was not a major part of the West 
German economic recovery, Moscow assumed the great industrialists had 
somehow designed the German economic recovery to prepare for war 
with much the same unity of purpose as did the the Soviet planning agency 
(Gosplan). Moscow failed to grasp, not only the mechanisms of a market 
economy, but also the logic of pluralist politics. In their attemptto explain the 
working of opposition parties, for example, Soviet diplomats assumed the 
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Western powers "in reality" used the German Social Democratic Party to 
"fool" and split the progressive forces in the Federal Republic. 50 
Soviet observers were strongly disposed to worry about Germany, and 
they generally erred on the side of caution; hence the urgency when 
developments in Germany took a truly alarming direction following the 
American decision to rearm the Federal Republic and integrate the country 
in the Western Alliance. 
The bomb at the Waldorf Asteria 
Worrying about Western Europe's vulnerabilityto Soviet pressure, American 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson had long played with the idea of German 
rearmament. The issue was highly emotional, however. Only after25 June 
1950, when North Korea attacked South Korea and created a war scare in the 
Atlantic Alliance, did Acheson proceed with the plan. In September,he broke 
the news to a North Atlantic Council meeting atthe Waldorf Astoria in New 
York. Acheson promised to reinforce the American troops in Europe, but 
made the reinforcement dependent on an increased European contribution to 
the alliance. This demand would put considerable strains on the West 
European economies unless the Europeans agreed to let Adenauer shoulder 
the burden of rearmament. 51 Everybody agreed except Paris. Due to the French 
objections, the communique from the foreign ministers on 19 September 
agreed only to raise "the problem ofthe participation of the German Federal 
Republic in the common defence ofEurope" .52 In reality, however, the stage 
was set for German rearmament. 
The need for a German defence contribution improved Adenauer's 
bargaining position and enabled him to secure more freedom of action for 
the Federal Republic. If the New York Council expected West Germany to 
defend the Alliance, the Western powers could scarcely suppress Boon's 
sovereignty and curb WestGermany'sindustrialproduction. Thus, the North 
Atlantic Council agreed to revise the Prohibited and Limited Industries 
Agreement (PLI)- a regime established by the Potsdam Conference to limit 
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the output of war-related German industries. The PU banned weapons 
production, limited the number, size and speed of German-built ships and the 
output of the German coal industry. After 1945, the Western powers had 
relaxed the PU somewhat, but the regime was still in place." 
The Soviet assessment of what happened in New York is summed up in 
two words: aggression and exploitation. The United States exploited 
Germany's resources to undertake an arms build-up directed at the Soviet 
Union. This was the basic mes&age from the East European foreign mini•-
ter& when they met in Prague from 20 to 22 October 1950 to prote&t the 
decisions of the North Atlantic Council. The Prague Declaration claimed 
that the Western powers were preparing "new military adventures in 
Europe". To realise this aim, the Atlantic Alliance was about to release the 
genie that had caused the Second World War. 54 
Only yesterday the peoples of France, Great Britain and the United 
States of America waged a sanguinary struggle against [H]itlerite 
aggression, against German imperialism - yet today the ruling 
circles of these countries are with their own hands restoring the 
Western German Army, releasing condemned war criminals, 
restoring the war industrial potential of Western Germany, reviving 
Western German imperialism.55 
The Prague Declaration claimed the Western power& had introduced a war 
economy in Germany "instead of ... improving the material conditions of 
life of the working people." While the Western powers were enriching the 
West German imperialists, ordinary people would have to forsake the 
benefits of trade with Eastern Europe and pay higher taxes to finance 
"occupation troops".56 
The Schuman Plan to control German economic revival 
In May I 950, fearful of unrestrained German production of coal and steel -
the basic commodities of armament - French Foreign Minister Robert 
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Schuman proposed a European Coal and Steel Community(ECSC). Rather 
than curb the German production of steel and coal, Schuman proposed trading 
these commodities on a common European market. The market resembled a 
cartel, inasmuch as Schuman proposed a supranational body (the High 
Authority) to regulate output and prices." 
The ECSC negotiations were prolonged and heated. Although the rules of 
the Community would apply equally to all member countries, the new regime 
would particularly affect Germany. A common market would give non-Germ an 
producer& of steel, most notably the steel mills in French Lorraine, equal 
access to the rich coal deposits in the Ruhr region. To preserve its steel 
industry, Bonn foughtto maintain two institutions that restricted foreign 
access to Ruhr coal: a sales agency known to charge higher prices from 
foreign than domestic consumer& (Deutsche Koh/en-VerkaufJ, and a practice 
of coal mines producing exclusively for the steel mills that owned the pit 
( Verbundwirtscha.ft). Bonn gave in on both issues, partly because of American 
pressure, partly because Chancellor Adenauer hoped Bonn would gain 
respectabilitythrough participation in the Community. By the second week of 
March I 95 I, France, Italy, West Germany and the Benelux agreed to form a 
European Coal and Steel Community." 
Moscow explained the ECSC as an attemptto exploit Germany in an 
aggressive campaign directed against the Soviet Union. The Prague decla-
ration, for example, held the ECSC to be a "supra-monopolist concern" to 
"recreate the war industrial potential of Western Germany" at the "dictate 
of the United States" assisted by "the most reactionary groupings in 
Western Germany"." Soviet intelligence reports outlined five major goals 
that the United States attempted to achieve through the ECSC.60 First, to 
give the West Germans the concessions they demanded in return for 
joining the Western camp: Bonn received "the outward appearance of 
independence and equal rights" in a manner acceptable to the French. 
Second, Washington had introduced the Communityto preventthe Soviet 
Union from exercising its legal rights in Germany. Through the ECSC, the 
Americans removed the limitations on German industrial production 
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without Moscow's consent and frustrated the Soviet claim for war reparations 
from the Ruhr. 61 
Third, Moscow claimed that the supranationalHigh Authority enabled the 
Americans to control much of the economic activity in the ECSC member 
countries. As for the nature of the American rule, the various memos differed 
somewhat. The Soviet Control Commission in Germany, on one hand, claimed 
the ECSC would mean "the final destruction of national sovereignty[ ... ] and 
establishmentofUS hegemony in Western Europe". Monopolies from the 
New World would "in reality" hand-pick the membersofthe ECSC ruling body 
and use the Community's legal system to impose fines on firms and 
governments and "gatherthe power overall economic branches" in their 
hands." A memo to the Politburo was somewhat more sober and claimed only 
thatthe ECSC ran "contrary to the core national interests of the participating 
countries by underminingthe economic foundation for independence and 
sovereignty".63 
Fourth, the Americans would use the Community to expand Germany's 
industrial production, exploit the country and enrich themselves." Fifth, the 
Americans would use the ECSC to increase the "penetration of American 
capital into the European economy". These investments served as "a 
precondition for the development[ ... ] of the West German military-
industrial potential". The ECSC, that is, was a means to rearm Germany." 
Soviet diplomats took particular interest in the heated ECSC negotiations 
that lasted from May 1950 to March 1951. Moscow knew that the negotia-
tions had been "under the threat of failure" and would probably have fallen 
short had not the Americans intervened.66 In explaining why the ECSC 
negotiations almost broke down, the Soviet analysis downplayed French 
security concerns, discarded Bonn's hopes for recognition and equality, 
and overlooked the British preoccupation with sovereignty. 
Relying on the framework of Lenin's Imperialism, Moscow correctly 
explained the Schuman Plan as an attempt to secure markets and raw 
materials for French industry. Soviet diplomats, however, thought that the 
basic French motivation was profit rather than security worries. If we trustthe 
Kremlin, the ECSC negotiations were about French monopolies fighting 
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American monopolies for control over the German economy. The French 
effort was futile, Soviet diplomats assured: the correlation of forces was such 
that the" American point of view will invariably win".67 Likewise, London's 
decision not to participate in the ECSC was a result oflagging British 
competitiveness and fear of American economic superiority." 
The Soviet Diplomatic Mission in Berlin observed how the German 
monopolies were "standing ever more upright on their feet". While the 
Western powers fought amongst themselves, Bonn became "ever more 
demanding". 69 The rise of Germany had resulted in a tactical alliance 
between Bonn and Washington to get rid of British and French control. The 
ECSC was a deal whereby the Ruhr industrialists would remain subordinate 
to the United States for a while - as "a necessary step on the road" to 
economic and political might. When the time was right, German monopo-
lies would regain their supremacy in Europe." Because the Federal Repub-
lic accounted for 52 per cent ofECSC coal production and 38 per cent of 
ECSC steel production, German monopolies would have a predominant role 
in the Community.71 Never did the idea occur in a Soviet memo that 
appointed politicians on the High Authority, one from each member coun-
try, could restrain industry by majority voting. 
The Pleven Plan and how Moscow saw it 
A few days before the New York Council meeting in September 1950, the 
French government learned of the American determination to rearm 
Germany. Paris tried to block that decision, but members of the French 
political elite, like Jean Monnet and Prime Minister Reno! Pleven, realised 
that German rearmament was inevitable. On 26 October 1950, Pleven 
proposed accepting German soldiers, but not a German army. The French 
premier called for a complete assimilation (une.fusion complete) of West 
European soldiers and equipment into a European army. Small national units, 
for example a German infantry battalion, would rely on other nationalities to 
provide transport, artillery support and intelligence. The charm of a European 
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Anny organised according to Pleven's plan was that no member country (read 
Gennany) could wage war against any othermembercountry (read France). 
Besides, in an ordinary military alliance, any membercountry(read Gennany) 
could withdraw to pursue its national interests. If the Federal Republic left the 
European army, however, she would find herselfwithoutequipmentand 
without a military organisation. There would be but one European general staff 
under the surveillance of a European defence ministry. n 
A European army involved some disturbingimplicationsforthe nations 
involved. To avoid a new Wehrmacht, Paris would have to dissolve the 
French army - an idea that thoroughly upset the national sentiment. Since 
the British refused to take part, the West Gennans could possibly become a 
dominating member of the EDC. Furthennore, the lack of American 
participation could possibly weaken the trans-Atlantic bounds. The most 
pressing problem, however, was the lack of cohesion in a future European 
army. The soldiers that were to fight alongside each other would need a· 
common language and a degree of shared training. Thus, for the sake of 
military efficiency, the defence planners would like to make up the Euro-
pean army of units consisting of I 0 - 15,000 soldiers from the same 
country. These divisions would be equipped and organised to undertake 
sustained operations without assistance from other units. Gennan divi-
sions, however, capable of independent action, were exactly what Pleven 
had set out to avoid. n 
Soviet diplomats failed to see how the Pleven Plan could contain Gennany. 
The foreign ministry's annotation about Pleven' s plan did not report the idea of 
a total assimilation to tie down Gennany' s potential. Soviet observers, on the 
contrary, portrayed the European army as a military alliance where each state 
was to submit "parts of their armed forces" to a joint structure. 74 Even the 
sober and accurate assessments from the Committee on Infonnation failed to 
report on the worries about British and American non-participation in the 
EDC. 75 The British defence minister, Emmanuel Shinwell, thoroughly misread 
the Soviet sentiments when he predicted that the EDC structure "would excite 
laughter and ridicule" in the Soviet Union." 
26 DEFB\CESTUDIESl/1998 
Although the Soviet Control Commission saw the Pleven Plan as 
"apparently unworkable in praxis", Soviet observers never rejoiced, but 
rather struggled to uncover in what sinister way the European army suited 
the American aggressors." The Control Commission suggested that the 
EDC could serve as "a smoke screen for the more serious negotiations" to 
rearm the Federal Republic directly in the North Atlantic Alliance." Possi-
bly, the Americans preferred to sacrifice some military efficiency in return 
for greater obedience, so that the Soviet Union could no longer play on 
national sentiments to prevent the American war plans. Thus, "if the Pleven 
plan is carried through, it would without doubt be in the interests of the 
Americans, inasmuch as it foresees the elimination of the national armies 
and [ensures] their subordination to Eisenhower"." Soviet diplomats, that 
is, saw the EDC as an American attempt to impose Gennan soldiers on 
Western Europe. Washington had picked the Federal Republic to be Ameri-
ca's chief ally in Europe because "from an aggressor's point of view, she 
has better human resources than the other West European countries". 80 
Moscow and the idea of German sovereignty 
The Western occupation powers did not surrender the supreme authority in 
West Gennany although they set up the Federal Republic in 1949. After 
Adenauer had been elected chancellor by the lower house of parliament on 
15 September 1949, one of his first duties was to accept an Occupation 
Statute that gave the Western powers vaguely defined, but essentially 
unlimited, powers in the Federal Republic. The legal basis for the Occupa-
tion Statute was the unconditional Gennan surrender in 1945. In tenns of 
international law, the Westempowers were at war with Gennany until the 
summer of 1951, and their troops in the Federal Republic were legally 
occupation forces." 
The majority ofWest Gennans wanted the troops to stay, but resented the 
idea ofbeing occupied. Thus, in return for a West Gennan defence 
contribution, the New York Council meeting promised to tenninate the 
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state of war and review the Occupation Statute. The Western powers would 
retain certain well-defined privileges, such as the right to station troops in 
Germany, butthese rights would be defined in an agreement negotiated with 
Bonn." Under the new regime, the soldiers would stay on, not as occupation 
forces, but for the "defence of the free world"." Soviet diplomats (correctly) 
linked the decision to terminate the state of war and the intention to rearm 
West Germany. Indeed, by formally ending the occupation, the Western 
powers resolved a legal subtlety: ifthe Potsdarn regime remained in place, the 
future German soldiers would, in juridical terms, take part in the occupation 
oftheirown country. 
In Soviet eyes, the "false phrases" about ending the occupation served 
only as "a screen" to conceal the Western intention "to prolong their rule in 
Western Germany as long as possible"." The Third European Department 
of the Soviet Foreign Ministry (hereafter 'the German desk') acknowl-
edged that Adenauer received "concessions and indulgence"" from the . 
Western powers, but refused to believe the Western powers would surren-
der real control just as they were about to exploit the country. 
Soviet diplomats saw the presence of Western troops in Germany as the 
ultimate proofofBonn's lack of freedom. In Soviet thinking, a country 
housing American soldiers could not be fully sovereign, and as long as the 
troops stayed on, the talk about West German independence was "hypo-
critical through and through"." A foreign ministry report on the decision to 
terminate the state of war concluded that the Western powers would 
continue to "control all the bonn government's activities"." Another memo 
assured that the decision did not give the Federal Republic "even the 
slightest sovereignty"." Although Moscow continued to view the Federal 
Republic as an American dependency, Soviet diplomats kept an open eye 
on the political development west of the Elbe. 
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West German political culture and the shadow of Hitler 
During Stalin's lifetime, in-depth analysis ofNazism was strangely absent 
from Soviet writing. Whenever Stalin's diplomats needed a definition of 
fascism, they turned to Marxist class struggle analysis. Hence, the foreign 
ministry defined fascism as a terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, 
chauvinistic and imperialist element of monopoly capitalism. The capitalists 
impose fascism in times of deep crisis, when the proletarian revolution draws 
near, and the ruling bourgeoisie can no longer cling to power through the 
mechanisms of parliamentary democracy." This definition failed to mention 
totalitarianism, anti-Semitism, personality cult and other aspects ofN azism 
that coincided with developments in Stalin's Russia. For our purpose, it is 
important to note how the Soviet understanding of fascism encouraged 
Moscow to think of the Federal Republic as a Nazi regime under creation: 
fascism was not the antithesis of bourgeois democracy; fascism and bour-
geois democracy were but different phases of class rule. 
Suspecting that the Federal Republic and Nazi Germany had a lot in 
common, the Soviet diplomats looked carefully for a connection - and 
found what they set out to discover: the victory over Nazism in 1945 was 
not complete in West Germany. Numerous Soviet surveys of the Federal 
Republic found that the finance capital and the big industrialists, which 
Moscow believed to be the initiators of fascism, were alive and well. One 
report claimed that the West German government apparatus consisted "mainly 
of people representing big industry and banks, many of which have ties to 
American monopolies".90 Moscow did not, however, claim that Nazis ruled in 
Bonn. Soviet diplomats rather described the West German government as 
"openly revanchist [and) imperialistic.""' As for Adenauer himself, he was an 
"outright enemy of the Soviet Union", but presumably not a Nazi." 
The fight against Nazism and fascism was deadly serious, and Soviet 
diplomats declined from using the terms "Nazi" and "fascist" in common 
abuse. Certainly, Moscow despised people like Adenauer's minister of the 
interior, Robert Lehr, a former member of the August-Thyssen board of 
directors who now prosecuted Communists. Nevertheless, the Soviet 
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observers declined from calling Lehr a Nazi and settled for lesser insults like 
undercover agent, provocateur, protege, reactionary figure, traitor, revanchist, 
HimmlerofBonn, prison warden, hangman, strangler of freedom, bloody dog 
of the militarists and police-method minister." 
A favourite subject of memo writing in the Soviet foreign ministry was a 
group of 50 or so "fascist and nationalist" organisations. 94 The ex-soldier 
forum Bruderschqft and a few other right-wing organisations had some 
following. Nevertheless, Moscow did notterribly overstate the Nazi threat in 
West Germany- at least if we allow for a natural level ofNazi-scare common 
all over Europe after the Second World War. One report from the German 
desk admitted that nationalists and fascists were fringe groups with little 
support." Occasionally, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany 
addressed the subject with ironic distance, taking delight, for example, in how 
one Germanright-wingerhad mistaken the SPD leader, Schumacher,for 
actually being a Marxist." 
More pressing was the Soviet concern for revanchism among the seven 
to eight million Germans who had fled, or been expelled, from East 
Prussia, Sudetenland and the areas east of the Oder-Neisse line. The Soviet 
Control Commission claimed there were many land barons and Nazis 
among them and that their organisations were keen on spreading chauvin-
ism and anti-Soviet propaganda. Worse, the Adenauer government willingly 
kept the refugees out of work to keep them hostile and available for service in 
a future West German army." For the Soviet Union, the discontent among the 
German refugees provided opportunities as well as worries. Several memos 
argued that the German Communists should attempt to persuade these settlers 
to pursue their goals through an understanding with Moscow." 
The Soviet Control Commission was deeply concerned about 
Adenauer's clamp-down on the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). On 
11 September 1950, the Bundestag voted to remove several of the KPD's 
parliamentary privileges; eight days later, the government banished party 
members from the civil service (Beruftverbot). The Soviet Control 
Commission remarked that the clamp-downs coincided with the Atlantic 
Alliance's request for a German defence contribution.99 Soviet diplomats 
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considered legal actions against Communists as yet another aspect of German 
rearmament. 
The way Adenauer clamped down on the Communists added insult to 
injury. The chancellor branded Communists and Nazis together and used 
the Beruftverbot indiscriminately against both. Equally offensive was the 
legal action against Freie Deutsche Jugend. On 26 June 1951, Adenauer 
outlawed this Communistyouth movement by invoking a constitutional ban 
against organisations that were either criminal, anti-constitutional or opposed 
to the idea of human understanding.100 
Expecting nothing from Adenauer - not even fairness - Soviet diplomats 
searched for allies in the West German opposition. In some matters of 
foreign policy, the Social Democratic line of policy corresponded with 
Soviet points of view: Schumacher opposed West German membership in 
Nato and European integration; he also accused Adenauer of relinquishing 
German sovereignty to please the Allies -."Chancellor of the Allies", he 
once barked during a parliamentary debate.'" In basic terms, however, the 
SPD leader was pro-Western. Schumacher wanted an American security 
guarantee for the Federal Republic backed by a large contingent of Ameri-
can troops; he even accepted West German rearmament- but with no 
strings attached. 102 This nationalist touch made Soviet observers conclude 
that SPD supported German imperialism."' Besides, Schumacher loathed 
Communism. According to the Soviet Control Commission in Germany, he 
had a "beast-like hatred towards the Soviet Union".104 
The peaceful German public 
Moscow hoped to exploit those in the SPD who opposed the "right-wing 
leadership".'" Foreign policy split the Social Democrats. Some members of 
a left-wing faction within the party had made friendly overtures to the 
East, 106 and the SCC claimed to know "from reliable sources" that quite a 
few Social Democrats in parliament opposed rearmament but kept quiet to 
avoid an open split in the party .107 
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Such infonnation made Soviet diplomats conclude that the Gennan 
Communists should intensify their work among the Social Democrat rank 
and file. The goal of these activities was "to achieve unity of the working 
class" - that is to have SPD supporters reject the SPD leadership and close 
ranks with the Communists.'" Communist Party faithfuls fuelled Mos-
cow's hopes. In September 1951, for example, an East Gennan Commu-
nist visited his father in the West Gennan city of Essen. According to the old 
man, the West Gennan workers still relied on the SPD to express their 
discontent, but recently their attitude towards the Soviet Union and the GDR 
had "changed sharply in a positive direction". A report on this conversation 
made its way to the foreign minister's desk, and Foreign Minister Andrei 
Vyshinskii underlined every word as he read.109 
The Soviet assessment of the KPD oscillated, however, between hopes 
for the future and frustration about the present. Several reports described 
the work of the West Gennan Communists as "entirely inadequate"110 and 
"very feeble".''' Communist influence "in the masses" remained "utterly 
weak".'" According to Moscow, the cardinal failure of the KPD was 
sectarianism- that is, a preoccupation with work in closed groups rather than 
among the masses, frequently combined with ideological dogmatism.'" 
The Soviet foreign ministry recognised the fact that ordinary Gennans 
did not want war. After the December 1950 meeting in the North Atlantic 
Council, the Soviet Diplomatic Mission in East Gennany reported a strong 
public reaction against rearmament. 
The larger part of the population, including many former military 
people, is not supporting the remilitarisation policy because they 
fear that this policy might cause a war with the Soviet Union. This 
fear is made stronger by the fact that the fighting quality of the 
Americans is not held in high esteem in West Germany, particularly 
concerning the Korean war. 114 
The citation above is interesting, not only because the author stressed the 
popular West Gennan distaste of war, but also because the memo indicated 
why militarism lacked support. The strength of the Soviet Union and the 
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perceived weakness of the United States made the Gennans abstain from 
arming their country. The Soviet foreign ministry noticed a West Gennan 
opinion poll showing that fully 85 per cent ofthe West Gennans opposed 
military service, 68.4 per cent opposed rearmament and 82 per cent 
opposed Nato membership.'" In September 1950, only five per cent of the 
West Gennan male population would voluntarily serve in the army.'" 
The Wirtschaftswunder as the work of swordsmiths 
After the currency refonn in 1948, Western Gennany experienced strong 
industrial growth. The surprising speed of the recovery made the Gennans 
speak of a Wirtschaftswunder- an economic miracle. Industrial production 
Chart 1 -developments in the West German economy, 1948-1953'17 
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tripled from 1948 to 1953. During the last nine months of 1950 alone, 
production increased some 30 per cent and reached the level of 1938. Over 
the five-year period prior to 1953, wages jumped some 70 per cent, prices on 
capital goods rose about 20 per cent, but the cost of living hardly rose at all. 
In 1950 and 1951, Soviet diplomats closely followed the official eco-
nomic statistics from the Federal Republic. Except for the rise in wages, 
which Moscow tended tO disregard, the foreign ministry acknowledged the 
developments in West Germany (see Chart 1). Particularly the rise in 
production made Soviet observers draw alarming conclusions. Such growth, 
they concluded, was "not a result of a normal process during peaceful post-war 
conditions". The rapid expansion of West German industry was an "ac-
complishment based on war preparations"."' 
What particularly alarmed the Soviet observers was the similarities in 
the growth rates during the first few years of the Wirtschaftswunder and 
the last few years before the war. In 1936, after the great depression, 
Hermann Goring became plenipotentiary of a four-year plan to make 
Germany ready for war by 1940. Although the growth rates in Nazi 
Germany and the Federal Republic were similar, the politico-economical 
systems of the two regimes differed. The Nazi regime aimed at self· 
sufficiency and military needs;'" Adenauer's minister of the economy, 
Ludwig Erhard pur§ued liberal economics and trade. 120 Soviet diplomats, 
however, were inclined to overlook the differences between Goring and 
Erhard because they saw capitalism as a bridge between the two periods. 
One way or the other, the same omnipotent German monopolies ruled . 
with the same unity of purpose and the same diabolic cunning. Hence, 
Soviet diplomats believed they were witnessing the silhouette of a military 
build-up, not unlike the one Hitler had undertaken in the late 1930s."' 
In the wake of this arms build-up, Moscow saw signs of increasing 
exploitation of the West German workers. In September 1950, the Atlantic 
Council agreed to make use of West Germany's military potential. That fall, 
the Federal Republic also experienced a period of particularly high inflation. 
For a few months in late 1950 and early 1951, consumer prices rose faster 
than wages (see Chart I). Thus, in May 1951, some nine months after the 
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New York Council meeting, the SCC concluded that "a prolonged reduc-
tion in the living standard of the workers has begun". 122 Because the 
Western powers were allocating investments, manpower and rawmaterials 
to strategic industries rather than consumer industry, the cost of living rose 
and workers suffered. 
The Soviet forecast predicted that the exploitation of the German 
workers would become ever more severe. Moscow believed American 
investments were the main catalyst for West German growth. Since the 
budget deficit, the war in Korea and the various aid programs starved 
Washington of funds, the United States would be unable to provide addi-
tional credits to Boon."' On the contrary, the Americans would expect 
Bono to pay for the occupation. Consequently, the Wirtschaftswunder 
would come to a halt, and only by exploitation of the German workers 
could Bono rebuild the destroyed infrastructure, equip a new army and pay 
for the occupation troops. In trying to predict how severe the exploitation 
would be, Soviet diplomats assumed that the forthcoming arms build-up 
would be comparable in volume to that of Nazi Germany. The Federal 
Republic, however, had fewer resources and fewer people than Hitler 
possessed. Besides, the country had still not recovered from the Second 
World War. Therefore, the exploitation of the West German resources 
would be "considerably higher than the corresponding demands of the 
hi tier state before the second world war" .'24 
Soviet diplomats struggled to explain away why the German economy 
continued to emphasise consumer industry. The Western powers still 
prohibited arms production, and the absence of a "scissors crisis" con-
vinced Soviet observers that the West German growth was balanced and 
not centred around heavy industry.'" Contrary to Soviet expectations, 
inflation hit the industrialists as hard as, or even harder than, the workers. 
Nevertheless, Moscow was convinced that the West German civilian 
production was part of an arms build-up. According to Soviet observers, 
the American war machine exploited West Germany by means of trade. 
Trade enabled the Americans to ship Genitan products abroad and use 
them in military production elsewhere in the Atlantic Alliance. Even harm-
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less consumer goods could be of use. Following the war in Korea, Washington 
had called upon German industry to "fulfil military orders (tailor army 
uniforms, produce boots for the army and so on)"."' Besides, German 
production could offset a fall in civilian production caused by arms production 
in the United States or elsewhere. 
Chart 2 - West German international trade (in million D·marks)127 
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A Western economist would object that German imports rose just as fast 
as exports (see Chart 2). Hence, there was no net tapping of German 
resources. Furthermore, the Western powers had not forced the Federal 
Republic to pay for the additional number of troops on her territory. On the 
contrary, Bonn paid less than before. Again, the SCC managed to find an 
'explanation consistent with the theory that the United States exploited West 
Germany for military purposes: the Western powers refrained from putting 
additional burdens on Germany because they wanted "a healthy economic 
foundation" for a defence contribution.'" Thus, the non-exploitation of 
West Germany was as worrying as the exploitation of the country. One 
was proof of German war preparations, the other was proof of American 
war preparations. 
Soviet diplomats saw the effects of American imperialism, not only in 
the Wirtschaftswunder, but also in West Germany's cultural life. A colourful 
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44memo from the SCC worried about the numerous American movies and 
the illustrated magazines that flooded Europe and influenced German 
popular culture. "Thieves, prostitutes, detectives, traitors and all kinds of 
'record-breakers' have become heroes of the day". the sec observed.'" 
Whereas Hollywood seduced the common man, Washington used "anti-
scientific printing" and "abstract art" to dull the minds of the intellectuals 
and "harm the German national character". Because militarisation had 
starved the cultural life of funds, the Yankees could "bribe" intellectuals to 
take part in "espionage, and destruction of the national resistance". To 
prove the point, the report mentioned a "competition for the best poster to 
popularise the Marshall-plan". 130 
Moscow eyes threats and opportunities 
In assessing the Soviet picture of Germany, it is useful to make some 
distinctions. Concerning verifiable facts - the strength of the German 
economy or the pace of European integration - the Soviet assessment was 
fairly sober. Moscow's fear of a united and hostile brotherhood of 
monopolists was much exaggerated - but not entirely misperceived. In 
1950, the United States pushed for West German rearmament with impres-
sive power and capability. Thomas Schwartz has even argued that the 
Federal Republic "was effectively a part of the American political, eco-
nomic and military system, more like a state such as California or Illinois 
. . I t t te" 131 than an independent sovereign nation or a eo any or pro ec ora . 
The Soviet assessment of Western intentions, however, erred badly on 
the militant side. Soviet diplomats saw the capitalist world as inherently 
aggressive. This assumption was not questioned. If the West failed to . 
show aggression, the Soviet diplomats never rejoiced, but redoubled their 
efforts to uncover the Western plot. 132 The Wirtschaftswunder, Hollywood, 
the German Social Democratic Party - everything was part of a great 
conspiracy aimed at the Soviet Union. 
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The foreign ministry saw the various efforts to contain West Germany as 
preparations to "get ready for the third world war that the imperialist circles 
[ ... ] are preparing".m The Federal Republic could quickly be turned into a 
weapons mill for the Atlantic Alliance.134 Besides, the Americans moved to 
strengthen their "bastion" of support: "the big monopolies, the reactionaries, 
and the revanchistsand the fascistelements". 135 To subdue the "democratic 
organisations"in West Germany, the Americans applied "directterroror 
terror through the hands ofthe bonn government" .13' 
Moscow did see, however, an opportunity inherent in the threat of 
German militarisation. In preparing for aggression, the Western powers 
suppressed political freedoms and neglected public welfare. The clamp-
down on the German Communist Party and the inflation that hit Germany 
in the fall of 1950, signalled an ever more severe exploitation of the work-
ers. In the end, this exploitation would provoke a popular discontent that 
the Soviet Union could draw upon. If the German Communists did their job 
properly, the German public would come out against rearmament and in 
favour of the Soviet Union. 
38 
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A Soviet strategy aimed at public opin-
ion, September 1950 - June 1951 
Assuming that Western citizens would not accept German rearmament, 
Moscow devised a strategy aimed at public opinion. In late 1950 and early 
1951, the Politburo accepted a diplomatic frontal attack against the Western 
plans to rearm the Federal Republic. In negotiations with London, Paris and 
Washington, Moscow demanded that Germany stay demilitarised. The 
Soviet Union did not aim to achieve Western acceptance of the status quo 
in Germany; instead Moscow hoped to use the limelight of the negotiating 
table to make the public aware of the grave developments in Germany. 
In effect, Moscow set out to make the Western public aware of the 
grave danger of German militarism that Soviet observers had observed 
through a distorted ideological lens. The task of Soviet diplomacy, that is, 
was to "unmask" (razoblahat;) how the Western powers "fooled" 
(obmanyvat;) the people in order to militarise Germany. By showing how 
things worked "in reality" (v su]nosti), the Soviet diplomats hoped to 
create a strong popular reaction that could force the Western powers to 
abide by the Potsdam agreement and refrain from arming Germany. 
Calling the Council of Ministers to discuss Germany 
To attack German militarism and awake the public, Moscow needed a 
proper arena. Hence, on 3 November 1950, Moscow demanded a summit 
of the four great powers to discuss "the fulfilment of the Potsdam agree-
ment regarding demilitarisation of Germany".137 
Because the decision to rearm the Federal Republic was controversial, 
the Western powers felt obliged to meet the Soviet demand for talks about 
the German problem. London and Paris believed that a refusal to discuss 
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the Gennan question would come to be seen as eagerness in anning the 
Gennans, and the two governments were inclined to accept the Soviet 
proposal. 138 British foreign minister Herbert Morrison, for example, liked 
the idea of an agreement with the Soviet Union. In early January 1951, the 
American ambassador in London, Waiter Gifford, cabled that London 
might be willing to negotiate for a peace treaty and a neutral Gennany: 
"Indeed they do not see how it would be possible from standpoint public 
opinion in West to reject such an offer if phrased in such manner as to give 
impression of sincerity."139 Acheson, however, feared a Soviet agenda that 
focused strictly on the dangers of Gennan militarism and hence prevented 
the Western powers from airing the various Soviet actions that allegedly 
justified the controversial plan to involve Gennan soldiers in the defence of 
Europe.Before the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels, 18-19 
December 1950, the three powers agreed both to push for Gennan rearma-
ment and pursue negotiations with the Soviet Union. Whereas the Soviet 
Union had called for a full CFM session, the three Western powers agreed 
only to a meeting of deputy foreign ministers to discuss the agenda of a 
possible CFM session. 140 Besides, London, Paris and Washington wanted 
the agenda to include both "the causes of the present international tensions" 
and "questions related to Gennany and Austria" .1• 1 
Within the Sovi.et foreign ministry there were different views about which 
questions to raise prior to the forthcoming negotiations. The Gennan desk 
favoured a rather broad agenda that included not only "other questions 
concerning Gennany" but questions related to Austria as well.142 Indeed, the 
Gennan desk re-examined the Soviet position on Austria. A memo from 
January 1951 argued that the Soviet Union should relax its position somewhat 
in Austria. Moscow did not need to insist on forced repatriation of displaced 
persons, and there was room for compromise in questions regarding Austria's 
pre-1938 debts to the Western powers and the country's war-related debts to 
the Soviet Union.143 
Whereas the Gennan desk was willing to consider the Austrian question, 
. Molotov held a different view. Molotov had served as Soviet foreign minister 
from 1939 to 1949, and he still held a seat on the Politburo. The diplomats 
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were in no position to object as Molotov censored the Soviet reply note and 
removed the suggestion about discussing Austria. Consequently, the 
answer that the Soviet Union sent on 30 December 1950 demanded talks 
on German reannament, not "corisultations on one question or another" .'44 
After another round of notes, the Soviet Union relaxed its position 
somewhat and conceded the discussion of any questions related to the 
Potsdam treaty. Although the four powers still differed on the purpose of 
the great power talks, London, Paris and Washington agreed to let their 
deputy foreign ministers meet in Paris for exploratory talks about a possible 
CFM session. 145 
Gromyko's quest for discretion 
In planning for the forthcoming talks, Gromyko continued to consider the 
possibility of a broad agenda that would allow some discretion. Although 
the main Soviet focus was on German demilitarisation, Gromyko argued 
that a peace treaty with Gennany should be a clear Soviet second priority. 
If the agenda for the CFM session was expanded to include questions apart 
from Gennan demilitarisation, "the Soviet representative should insist that 
the question of a peace treaty with Gennany be included on the agenda, 
including the adoption of a time table for the swift preparing of a peace 
treaty" .146 
Gromyko hoped to make room for some Soviet concessions in order to 
extract Western promises. He considered the possibility that the Soviet 
Union might give in on the issue of all-Gennan elections in order to have 
the Western powers discuss Gennan unity.147 Gromyko was willing, even 
eager, to discuss the Korean "incident". Ideally, the Soviet Union would 
pref~r to involve Beijing in such talks, but he would agree to make Korea a 
subject for "unofficial consultations between the Ministers" even if the West 
refused to let the Chinese take partY' Gromyko's willingness to compromise 
was limited; he would not discuss anns limitations lest the Western powers 
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agreed to discuss nuclear weapons, and he would not discuss the peace 
treaties with Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. 149 
. Negotiations a la Molotov 
Whereas the leader of the German desk, Mikhail Gribanov, and Gromyko 
had considered a broad agenda for the Palais Rose, Molotov imposed a 
narrow focus: "insist that compliance with the Potsdam agre~ment in the 
question of German demilitarisation be considered first". This was the 
essence of the paper that the Politburo approved on I March 1951.150 
As long as demilitarisation was considered first, Molotov placed no 
conditions on the rest of the agenda; he simply did not expect the CFM 
session to survive the discussion on German demilitarisation. During this 
first session, Moscow seemingly aimed to disclose the Western aggressors 
in front of global public opinion. Although the Western powers would 
abandon the summit, the resulting public outcry would deter the Western 
powers from rearming Germany. 
Moscow had reasons to believe their tactics would succeed. Most 
Germans were opposed to rearmament, and the neutrality movement was 
strong. Hence, Vyshinskii instructed the German desk to prepare for the 
Palais Rose with "the demands of the German population for neutrality" in 
mind. 151 Moscow could also hope to exploit the disagreement between the 
United States, England and France on how to handle the Soviet Union. 
Soviet diplomats knew that Acheson opposed talks, but "certain circles" in 
France, Britain and the United States wanted to test the Soviet readiness to 
reach a compromise. 152 
The picture of a hard-line Soviet negotiating strategy is further strength-
ened if we temporarily leave the Palais Rose exploratory meeting of depu-
ties and instead examine what Moscow hoped to achieve if the Palais Rose 
meeting result.ed in a summit of the foreign ministers. A raw draft of the 
Soviet negotiation strategy for a possible summit confirms that Moscow 
hoped to exploit the public resentment against German soldiers. If a 
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summit were to take place, the first task of the Soviet foreign minister 
should be to propose a declaration of intent to keep Germany demilitarised. "It 
will be hard for the Ministers of the three powers to reject our proposal", 
Gribanov argued. "If they nevertheless were to decline it," the Soviet Union 
would "gain politically in front of the world public" .153 
Second, the Soviet Union should ask for a four-power exploratory 
commission. This commission would serve a dual purpose: make the 
Western powers observe the various paragraphs on demilitarisation in the 
Potsdam and Yalta agreements; and investigate the Western complaint 
about the East German barracked police. The Western powers claimed that 
these alert troops (Bereitschaften) formed a regular army camouflaged as 
police units. The German desk thought a closer examination could deprive 
the Western powers of this "propagandistic card" and disclose their "false 
allegation".154 
Third, the German desk wanted to write a number of regulations into a 
new treaty on German demilitarisation. This text should ban militaristic 
propaganda, forbid production and import of arms, restrict the number of 
people employed in the police and prohibit Germans from serving in the 
armed forces of foreign countries.'" 
The Palais Rose meeting 
On 5 March 1951, the exploratory talks between the deputy foreign 
ministers of the four powers began at the Palais Marbre Rose in Paris. The 
Soviet Union pressed hard to place demilitarisation first on the agenda. 
Moscow's second priority was a peace treaty with Germany. Third, 
Gromyko would like to discuss arms reductions. The Western powers, on 
the other hand, wanted to discuss reasons for the present international 
tension and measures to improve relations between East and West; second, 
an Austrian peace treaty; third, German unity and a peaceful settlement with 
the country. None of the Western powers would agree to discuss German 
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demilitarisation without a simultaneous debate about the international 
tensions that allegedly justified West Gennan rearmament. 156 
On 28 March, Grornyko softened the Soviet position somewhat. He 
agreed to discuss demilitarisation, not as a separate point, but as the first 
sub-point under the heading "international tensions" .157 Since the British and 
French delegations were inclined to accept the Soviet proposal, the Ameri-
cans had to ask President Harry Truman for instructions. The president 
agreed that demilitarisation could be the first sub-point under item one, but 
only if that question was the sole remaining obstacle to achieving a CFM.1" 
On 30 March, however, Gromyko demanded two additional points on the 
agenda: the Atlantic Treaty and American military bases in Europe and the 
Near East. 159 The Western powers could not possibly allow a discussion 
about the Alliance, but Gromyko was unyielding. London, Paris and 
Washington now felt they had given in on the question of Gennan demilita-
risation without receiving anything in return, and the Western powers 
decided to abandon the Palais Marbre Rose negotiations. 160 The conference 
ended inconclusively on 21 June 1951. 
Moscow's failure to achieve a CFM was largely self-inflicted. Possibly, 
the Soviet demand for Gennan demilitarisation might have been accepted 
back in 1947 when Secretary of State George Marshal] had proposed a 
pact against Gennan remilitarisation. 161 By 1951, however, the Politburo's 
unyielding demand to keep Boon unarmed was futile, and Moscow 
achieved nothing but uniting the Western powers. American advisor Perry 
Laukhuff rejoiced when he outlined the Soviet negotiation behaviour to 
Hank Byroade at the Bureau of Gennan Affairs: "Gromyko again proved 
that the Russians are sometimes our best allies", the American advisor 
explained. During a two-hour speech, Gromyko "gave the plainest intima-
tion that the Soviets desire to have a wording accepted which will tie the 
hands of the three Powers". A "delighted" Laukhuff concluded that 
Gromyko's speech "ought to make our discussions of tactics with the 
French and British much easier" .162 
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Soviet considerations about a German peace treaty 
Behind Gromyko's barrage of accusations, and Moscow's unyielding, 
stubborn demand for Gennan demilitarisation, the Soviet foreign ministry 
considered a different strategy. Ministry officials also considered a softer 
approach, preoccupied not with propaganda, but with the results that 
possible negotiations with the Western powers could yield. The Gennan 
desk set out to review the Soviet negotiating position. 
In preparing for a forthcoming CFM session, the Gennan desk re-
examined previous Soviet peace treaty proposals. Gribanov hoped to repeat 
a number of the suggestions that Molotov had made at the previous CFM 
session in December 1947, when Molotov had pushed for a four-power 
commission to prepare a treaty draft. 163 Since the Western powers had 
refused the Soviet proposal back in 1947, they were unlikely to accept it 
now. Hence, at a forthcoming CFM session, "the Soviet delegation cannot 
limit itself to repeating its previous suggestions only. It is necessary to take 
a step forward in this respect." 164 Thus, if the Western powers refused to 
let a commission propose a peace treaty, Moscow should request that each 
power submit separate drafts. Gribanov argued that this procedure was 
necessary in order to get a concrete topic on the table for the foreign 
ministers to consider. 165 
The Gennan desk probably began to work on a peace treaty sketch. On 
7 February 1951, Gribanov told the foreign minister that the Gennan desk 
had prepared a "draft of the foundations for a peace treaty with Ger-
many".166 We do not know exactly what kind of peace treaty Gribanov had 
in mind, but he asked for a "qualified commission" to revise the peace 
treaty proposal. In picking commission members, Grihanov chiefly looked 
for experience in international Jaw. Gribanov hoped to enlist Sergei 
Golunskii who headed the foreign ministry's department for international 
Jaw, Vsevolod Durdenevskii who helped prepare the Potsdam agreement 
and Vladimir Khvostov, a scholar on international relations. 167 Although 
Gribanov twice petitioned the foreign minister to establish an experts 
commission, it was apparently never fonned. 
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I have not been able to uncover any draft agreement from the spring of 
1951. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some assumptions about Soviet 
thinking by inferring conclusions from how Soviet diplomats looked upon the 
situation in Austria. Having been annexed by Hitler in March 1938, Austria 
took part in the Second World War as a part of Germany. After the war, the 
Allies split Austria from Germany and divided the country and its capital, 
Vienna, into four zones of occupation - one for each of the great powers. 
The Soviet Union obstructed the talks on an Austrian peace treaty from 
1948 on, but at that time the occupying powers had already allowed the 
forming of a body that resembled a central government.'" In the Austrian 
government, each party held a number of posts according to its strength in 
parliament. 
In the winter of 1950-51, The Economist and New York Times argued that 
Austria might serve as a model for a German solution. Although Germany 
would probably remain divided and occupied, the great powers should 
. nevertheless allow the German people to elect a parliament and form a unitary 
government with nation-wide authority. With time, the country could be 
allowed full sovereignty and a national army. This solution was dubbed 
Austrianisation of Germany."' 
The German desk considered German Austrianisation, but disapproved 
of the model because it failed to offer Moscow sufficient influence. The 
Austrian experience had shown that Communists would probably not be 
able to muster a blocking minority in parliament, far less a majority. Hence, 
if Moscow agreed to introduce the Austrian model in Germany, ''the GDR 
Government would be left in a situation of permanent minority and would 
not be able to influence the decisions of the all-German government to any 
degree"."" To offset the lack of Communist parliamentary influence in a 
united Germany, the Soviet Union would need some degree of direct 
control over German affairs, but not in this respect either did Austria offer 
a workable solution. The 1946 control agreement on Austria did not permit 
the Soviet Union to block regular laws and decisions by the Austrian 
government; Moscow could veto "constitutional laws" only.171 According 
to the German desk, this regime had prevented Soviet diplomats from 
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blocking legal actions that "every now and then directly contradicts, not 
only our interests, but also the decision taken earlier by the four pow-
ers" ."2 
The German desk concluded that "a transfer of the Austrian experience in 
its present form to Germany cannot be acceptable for the Soviet Union". The 
idea proposed by The Economist and New York Times would give the Western 
powers "a majority in all controlling organs, and also in the all-German 
government." The only efficient Soviet leverage of powers would be the 
use of military authority "which.in its turn would aggravate our status as 
an occupation power" .173 
Although the Austrianisation memo was preoccupied with what to 
avoid, the memo nevertheless offers some clues as to what kind of solution 
Moscow might have attempted in Germany. At one point the memo held 
Austrianisation to be unacceptable because "such a plan to re-establish 
German unity diverge from our thesis about German unification ·on a parity 
basis". 174 Unification on a parity basis, we must assume, would mean 
Soviet influence on par with the Western powers. Besides, the German 
desk complained about the inability of the Soviet Control Commission to 
stop undesirable actions of the Austrian government. Applying the logic in 
reverse, we must assume the Soviet foreign ministry would demand a de 
facto veto in important German political decisions if unification were to be 
attempted. Nothing, however, suggests that the German desk planned for a 
Sovietisation of Germany. 
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The decision to focus on a German 
peace treaty, July-September 1951 
Prior to the Palais Rose conference, the Politburo had instructed Gromyko to 
negotiate like Moses in Egypt: Go see Pharaoh and wear him down with the 
righteousness of your demands. Moscow had hoped for a powerful public 
reaction against German rearmament, butthe public stayed calm, and the 
Western powers stood firm. Despite this failure, the Soviet foreign ministry 
did not seem to undertake any critical examination of the previous strategy. 
This inability to admit mistakes, no doubt, is explained by the logic of 
totalitarianism. To question the wisdom of a Politburo decision was to 
question the infallibility of Stalin. Soviet diplomats only admitted having 
underestimated the aggressiveness of the Western powers and their 
determination to break with the Potsdam decisions. 1" 
Nevertheless, the Soviet foreign ministry learned a lesson from the 
failure at Palais Rose. One strategy had failed, hence the need for a new 
one. This logic offered an opportunity to those who thought Soviet inter-
ests would be best served through a negotiated deal with the Western 
powers. In September 1951, the Politburo approved a new strategy. 
Moscow should elaborate a concrete deal that convinced the Germans 
about the virtues of unification and a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. 
Possibly, the Soviet suggestions might form the basis for negotiations with 
the West about German unification. 
This chapter will also touch upon the qualms that followed this change of 
strategy. At the Palais Rose meeting, the Soviet Union had insisted only on 
German demilitarisation. The Politburo thought it unwise to drop the demand 
for German demilitarisation abruptly since a swift change in Soviet policy 
could make an impression of weakness in the face of a decisive Western 
policy. From fear oflooking weak, and thus encouraging the Western powers 
to push even harder for rearmament, the Soviet Union chose notto draft a 
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peace treaty immediately, but rather to work on public opinion for a while. 
According to this logic, it would be better if the Germans themselves asked 
for a peace treaty, since a German plea would give Moscow an honourable 
excuse to offer a deal without appearing to be timid. Thus, to provide a proper 
pretext for the new Soviet policy, Moscow employed the East German 
Communists to create a popular demand for a peace treaty. 
German rearmament approaches 
In the summer of1951, the schemes to include the Federal Republic in the 
Atlantic Alliance began to make headway. American decision-makers like 
the American high commissioner in Germany, John McCloy, and General 
Dwight Eisenhower, came round to support the European Defem~e Cm~­
munity; they knew the French fears of a revived Germany and beheved m 
the long-term advantage of European political unity. The United States 
threw its support behind the EDC, and by the end of June 1951, the parties 
agreed on how to train, organise and supply a European army with German 
soldiers - although the French had not come along to support single-nation 
divisions. In return for West German participation in the EDC, the Western 
powers promised the Federal Republic sovereignty, and in July the United 
States and Great Britain terminated the state of war with Germany. The 
Western powers demanded a right to station troops in Germany, but these 
rights would be defined in an agreement negotiated with Bonn. 
While the plans for military integration went on, Adenauer moved 
decisively to quell the Communist campaigns against rearmament. On 24 
April 1951, the chancellor prohibited a KPD campaign to collect signatures 
against German rearmament and in favour of unification and a peace treaty. 
Several·West German cities banned Communist rallies, and in early May, 
. d 176 Bonn shut down thirteen Communist newspapers for a 90-day perto . 
Moscow saw both trouble and opportunities. The harsh treatment of the 
West German Communists convinced Sovietdiplomats that the Communist 
policies were popular and hence dangerous to Adenauer. 177 On the other hand, 
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the Soviet Control Commission and the SED knew that the activities ofthe 
West Gennan Communists in the spring of 1951 suffered from "grave 
failures"."' The KPD fared badly in elections for the state-assemblies 
(Landtag) ofRhineland-Palatinateand Lower Saxony; local elections for the 
municipalities ofSchleswig-Holsteingave no comfort either. 179 Despite the 
efforts of numerous East Gennan activists, several resolutions ordering the 
KPD to redouble its efforts and a flood ofbrochures, the West Gennan 
population still did not trust the Soviet Union. The ongoing campaign to 
collect signatures against reannamentwas not making much headway, and 
local committees in charge of this "referendum" struggled. Pieck told the 
SCC leadershipabout "visualAngst and cowardice" in the campaign 
activities.180 
The plan to embarrass Adenauer by calling for an aii-
German assembly 
In the early summer of 1951, the Gennan desk continued to elaborate 
diplomatic initiatives in the spirit of the Soviet strategy at Palais Rose. The 
initiatives in question aimed only to stir Gennan public opinion. The Soviet 
Union could, for example, propose a pact against Gennan militarism - a 
pact the Western powers would never sign. Nevertheless, such a proposal 
could make the Gennan public aware of the alleged militarisation that took 
place in West Gennany. Likewise, Moscow could propose a pact against 
Gennan remilitarisation or offer to discuss anns reductions "without 
preconditions". The Gennan desk knew that the Western powers would 
"without doubt reject" these proposals. That did not matter, however, since 
these suggestions would nevertheless make the Soviet Union look good. 
Better still, they would expose the Western powers as "aggressors, aiming 
to exploit the material and human resol!fces of Gennany to prepare a new 
war".JBJ 
The most interesting of these propagandistic proposals, was a promise 
to let the Gennans have a say in the unification process. Democratic 
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unification had previously been associated with Adenauer. The chancellor 
claimed that Gennany was divided, not because the Federal Republic joined 
forces with the West, but because the Russians would not let the East 
Gennans vote freely. Adenauer's insistence that unification must "grow out 
of the free decision of the entire Gennan people" had a powerful appeal."' 
Thus, Soviet diplomats felt obliged to face the issue, although they consid-
ered Gennan unification an issue for the great powers to handle. 
Indeed, Moscow had already promised the Gennans a limited say in the 
unification process. The October 1950 Prague Declaration called for a 
Constituent Council where Gennans from East and West could meet in 
equal numbers. This Council should fonn an aii-Gennan government, 
prepare elections and advise the four powers in drafting a peace treaty .183 
The East Gennans used the slogan "Gennans at one table" (Deutsche an 
einen Tisch!) in a broad campaign to support the Prague proposal.184 
Adenauer, however, rejected the very idea of a Constituent Council. He 
claimed that the East Gennan people could not express their true opinion 
before East Berlin had introduced civil liberties "in hannony with the 
Federal Republic's constitution and its implementation"."' 
Adenauer's belligerent reply delighted the Gennan desk. Soviet observ-
ers believed Adenauer was afraid of an aii-Gennan council and that he 
deliberately made his answer unacceptable for the GDR government."' 
Adenauer, that is, preferred to side with the West rather than to attempt 
unification. If Moscow could disclose this national treachery, the public 
would oppose remilitarisation and demand unification. 
The most efficient way to disclose Adenauer' s anti-unification sentiment, 
was to have the chancellor reject a generous Soviet proposal. Hence, the East 
Gennans should allow the more numerous West Gennans a majority in an aii-
Gennan council to prepare for unification ("[ ... ]onemight not make any 
mention of the representatives being split in an equal number from West 
Gennany and from the GDR"). 187 Bereft of his best argument againstthe 
Council, but nevertheless destined to side with the Americans, Adenauer 
would find himselfbetween the devil and the deep blue sea. His arguments 
about democracy and elections would sound hollow. The Gennan people 
DEFENCE STUDIES 1/1998 51 
' t' 
would see that Bonn was againstunification,East Berlin in favour. Hence, "the 
GDR will stand to gain politically and will, as before, be a standard-bearer for 
unity in the eyes ofthe German public".'" 
The Constituent Council proposal aimed narrowly to embarrass the 
chancellor. If Adenauerfor some reason should appear to be reasonable and 
agree to negotiate, the East Germans should embitter the pill. They could 
demand "an end to the remilitarisation of West Germany" or raise other 
questionsthatAdenauerwould not accept. Somehow Adenauerwould be 
forced to abandon the negotiations and compromise himself."' 
Continued work on a German peace treaty 
In the summer of 1951, the foreign ministry considered not merely proposals 
aimed at the German public, but also a possible strategy for real negotiations 
with the Western powers to solve the German question. In July, Gribanov 
elaborated a menu offoreign policy measures. This document contained a 
long section dubbed "On a peace treaty with Germany". Gribanov argued that 
the Soviet Union should prepare "a basic draft of a peace treaty with 
Germany". The text might form the basis fornegotiations with the West. 
Therefore, Gribanov hoped to assemble a "qualified commission". The task of 
this commission should be to "work out the fundamental draft of a peace 
treaty with Germany in one month's time". The drafting commission should 
have assistance from "responsible agencies" and "scientific research 
institutes". 190 
Gribanov portrayed the idea of a peace treaty as a continuation of a 
well-established Soviet policy - albeit one that Moscow had not pursued for 
three and a half years. To elaborate the text of a peace treaty, Gribanov 
argued, would "correspond with the position that the Soviet Government 
has always taken on sessions of the CFM, arguing in favour of preparing a 
peace treaty with Germany'' .191 
Previously, Moscow had either insisted that a four-power commission 
should do the drafting or that each of the four powers presented peace 
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treaty drafts simultaneously. Because the Western powers were unlikely to co-
operate, Gribanov now proposed that the Soviet Union should publish a peace 
treaty text alone. Presumably, Moscow would rather include the Western 
powers in the preliminary drafting of a peace treaty. Any peace treaty would 
include less than ideal solutions, and the Kremlin would prefer to let the 
Western powers take some responsibility for the resulting controversies. 
Consider the borders of a united Germany: if Moscow made Saar a German 
province, then the French would object; if the Soviettreatytextgave Saara 
special international status, then the Germans would object. By venturing on 
its own, Moscow would be forced to defend the peace treaty text on its own 
merits, and not in comparison with other less-than-perfect proposals. 
Enter the East Germans 
On the evening of30 July 1951, President Wilhelm Pieck, Prime Minister 
Otto Grotewohl and SED General Secretary Waiter Ulbricht came to the 
headquarters of the Soviet Control Commission at Karlshorst to visit 
General Chuikov and his assistant political adviser, !van Ilichev. At this 
meeting, the German Communists proposed a broad public campaign in 
West Germany to weaken Adenauer and strengthen the standing of the 
GDR. To this end, they asked the Soviet Union for a concrete peace treaty 
initiative. 
Regrettably, there are no available minutes of the Karlshorst meeting. 
We have to rely on the sparse hand-written notes of Pieck'" and two short, 
and largely similar, memos that the German desk prepared for Vyshinskii 
and Gromyko. The information for Gromyko reads: 
The German friends intend to conduct a series of measures aimed 
against the remilitarisalion of West Germany. In particular, the 
Politburo of the SED Central Committee has decided to continue and 
to revive the drive to organise a referendum in West Germany 
against remi/itarisation and in favour of a peace treaty with 
Germany. 193 
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To get the campaign going, and to rally the faithful, the East Germans planned 
a series of conferences: one for the 750 or so Communist Party functionaries 
from all ofGermanythatwould attend the mid-Augustinternationalyouth 
festival in Berlin, another for Communist trade union activists, a third for the 
members ofthe Communistyouth organisation. 194 The campaign needed a 
focus. Hence, Grotewohl proposed an addition to the programme: a peace 
treaty before the end of 1951. "' 
For the campaign purposes that the East Germans had in mind, the 
actual contents and suggestions of a treaty seemed to matter less than the 
very peace treaty idea. The German desk failed to mention specific East 
German requests about the contents of a peace treaty, and remarked only 
that the East Germans had asked for a proposal "in the spirit of the Soviet 
delegation's actions at the [1947] London CFM session". 106 Pieck's notes 
from the Karlshorst meeting imply that Ulbricht's prime concern was 
propaganda, not actual solutions. According to Pieck, Ulbricht wanted a 
Soviet initiative that would make the masses understand the "Soviet Union 
[wanted] peace, the United States war"."' The SED leadership hoped to 
stir the West German public, not by clever diplomatic moves, but through 
street action and manifestations. By using the peace treaty issue as a 
rallying cry in their forthcoming campaign, East Berlin could also hope to 
link socialism with the question of national unity and thus rally the forces 
of patriotism in support for the GDR. 
A show of indecisiveness in the foreign ministry 
The foreign ministry embraced new initiatives only with reluctance. Indeed, 
the foreign ministry was expected to be subservient, execute orders and 
pursue established policies.'" lfforeign policy were a game of chess, the 
ministry should move the pieces, not determine the moves. In the late summer 
ofl951, however, as the Western powers moved rapidly to include the Federal 
Republic in the Western military co-operation, the German desk was forced to 
come up with some initiatives. The Soviet demands for German 
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demilitarisation at the Palais Rose Conference (March-June 1951) had not 
made any impact, and Moscow was in need of a new strategy. It was the task of 
the German desk to make the first proposal. 
Gribanov, seemingly unable to guess what the Politburo might like to hear, 
decided to review the Soviet arsenal offoreign policy measures. The resulting 
policy papers failed to recommend a consistent line of action, either great 
power diplomacy or public campaigning, either the promise of a peace treaty 
or the threat of militarisation. Instead Gribanov composed policy papers with a 
mix of all the policies we have touched upon in this and the previous chapter. 
First, Gribanov asked for an experts' commission to draft the foundations 
of a peace treaty with Germany.'" Second, he suggested a note to the 
Western powers to protest European integration and to demand German 
demilitarisation, a smaller number oftroops in Germany and adherence to the 
Pots dam agreement. Third, the note should propose a peace treaty to provide 
momentum for the East German propagandacampaign for unity. Fourth, an all-
German Constituent Council with a West German majority should be 
convened- in order for Adenauerto embarrass himselfin rejecting it.200 
In early August, Vyshinskii returned from medical leave, resumed his 
duties as foreign minister and began to oversee Gribanov's work.201 
Vyshinskii had been chief prosecutor during the Moscow Process in the 
late 1930s, and the image of a venomous procurator stuck to him ever 
since- seemingly with reason.202 He devised an action plan against West 
German rearmament that was ripe with scorn, but contained even less 
substance and direction than Gribanov' soriginal scheme. In a paper prepared 
for the Politburo, Vyshinskii proposed to send the Western powers a long note 
and describe in detail their responsibility for the continued division of 
Germany and the lack of a peace treaty. Vyshinskii declined to form an 
experts-commission and produce a peace treaty sketch, and he did not explic-
itly allow an East German grassroots campaign. Rather, he wanted the GDR to 
petition the great powers "notto allow the remilitarisationofGermany". Upon 
receiving this note, Moscow would express its general support for a peaceful 
settlement- nothing more. Vyshinskii did not want the Soviet Union to 
challenge the Western powers to produce a concrete peace treaty. 203 
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Vyshinskiiembraced, however, the plan to haveAdenauerrejectan aii-
German Constituent Council. Under his guidance, the German desk elaborated 
the Constituent Council idea in greater detail. Pieck should ask for a 
Constituent Council and combine the official proposal with "broad support 
from civil organisations in GDR and West Germany". As before, the surprise 
element in the plan was "not to demand representative parity as a precondition 
[ ... ] in ordernotto give the bonn government any [ ... ] excuse to reject Pieck' s 
proposal". Vyshinskii, however, maintained thatthe East Germans should 
uphold "the principle of equality between the parties" .204 Thus, the foreign 
minister seemed ready to water down the constituent-council initiative as 
well. 
The Politburo's rebuke 
By the end of August 1951, Vyshinskii sent his plan to thelnstantsia- the 
vague expression that applied to the top level of decision-making, the 
Politburo and ultimately Stalin himself. Vyshinskii, however, had misread 
the sentiments of his superiors. The Politburo now instructed him 
[ ... ] to rework the proposed draft in three days time on basis of the 
exchange of views {in the Politburo]. so as to draw up a proposal on 
the questions that were posed by comrades Pieck, Ulbricht and 
Grotewohl in the meeting with Chuikov and Ilichev on 30 July. 205 
Now, the foreign minister wasted no time in making up for his mistake. 
Apparently, the Politburo had asked for a concrete peace treaty; the very same 
day the Politburo turned down his suggestions, Vyshinskii finally let Gribanov 
form an experts commission to sketch a peace treaty. The foreign minister 
ordered the Commission to work with reckless speed; whereas the German 
desk had asked for a month to prepare a first draft, the foreign minister 
scribbled on his orders: "Period ten days- before 6/IX [6 September]"."" 
The commission convened three of the most competent Soviet experts on 
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international law (Golunskii, Krylov and Khvostov),207 three senior experts on 
Germany (Semenov, Pushkin and Gribanov) and V .N. Pavlov, a specialist on 
Western Europe. Vyshinskiiapproved the commission, but appointed his 
deputy, Aleksandr Bogomolov, as chairman. Gribanov had suggested Golunskii 
on this post. 20' 
The Kremlin, moreover, ordered a new initiative to correspond with the 
"exchange of views" at the Politburo meeting. Vyshinskii ordered Pushkin, 
Semenov and Gribanov to spell out the opinion of the Politburo and prepare 
the text of a new resolution."' The first key passage of the new Politburo 
draft resolution admitted that the East Germans had been "in principle 
correct" to propose a new peace treaty initiative in combination with a 
public campaign.210 
But whereas the East German idea was "in principle" correct, the 
foreign ministry, and presumably the Politburo, saw some trouble in reality. 
If the Kremlin asked for a German peace treaty, the Western powers might 
think the Soviet Union needed one, and hence raise their demands. The 
experts, and presumably the Politburo, feared that Moscow: 
[ ... ] could create the impression that the Soviet Government, contrary 
to the position of the Soviet delegation on the preliminary meeting 
in Paris (March-June 1951) now suggests to call a CFM session to 
discuss only the question of a peace treaty with Germany. 211 
We do not know the Politburo's arguments, but most likely the Soviet 
decision-makers reasoned that no other option stood much chance of 
success. The Western powers had managed to ward off the demand for German 
demilitarisation,and Adenauer had subdued the Communist grassroots 
campaign. In order to avoid the appearance of weakness, the Soviet Union 
should carefully consider ''the timing and the form" of a peace treaty proposal. 
Rather than suggesting a peace treaty at once, as the East Germans had 
proposed, the Soviet Union should launch the treaty "somewhat later" after 
having "prepared the global public opinion for such a step".212 
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Heeding the opinion of the Politburo, the three experts proposed a 
propaganda offensive to .cover the Soviet retreat. The Gennan comrades 
should create a broad public demand in Gennany in favour of a deal. If the 
campaign were successful, the eventual Soviet proposal would look less 
like a withdrawal in the face of a detennined Western policy and more like 
a generous offer to satisfY a demand of the Gennan people. In effect, this 
reorientation turned the East Gennan proposal on its head: whereas the East 
Gennans would use the idea of a peace treaty to back an East Gennan 
campaign, the foreign ministry would use an East Gennan campaign to 
back the peace treaty proposal. 
The Soviet plan changed the nature of the East Gennan campaign 
activities. Whereas the SED general secretary hoped to attack Gennan 
militarism and embarrass Adenauer; the foreign ministry hoped to win as 
many Gennan souls as possible for a peace treaty - even black reactionary 
souls. Nothing would suit the Politburo better than to have Adenauer ask 
for a peace treaty. If the chancellor begged for a deal, nobody would 
suspect the Soviet Union of offering one out of weakness. 
Since the primary aim was no longer to confront Bonn, butto have the 
West Gennans join the plea for a peace treaty, the Constituent Council plan 
needed revising. The foreign ministry picked a new man for the task of 
inviting West Gennans to participate in the Council. In the previous plans, 
this task was entrusted with East Gennan President Pieck, who had been 
the figurehead of the Communist faction of the SED when the Soviet 
occupying power forcefully merged the Social Democrats with the Com-
munists. The new plan proposed that Grotewohl, not Pieck, should invite the 
West Gennans to participate in the Council.; Grotewohl was a fonner Social 
Democrat, who the Russians thought had a broader appeal.213 Besides, if 
Adenauer agreed to take part in a ConstituentCouncil, the East Gennans 
should refrain from anything that could disrupt the proceedings. Previously, 
the foreign ministry had always suggested an agenda that Adenauerwould 
never accept (demilitarisation and rejection ofEuropean integration). In the 
revised plan, these demands were no longer imperatives but issues that 
"might be launched". IfBonn agreed to talk, the East Gennans should only 
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"insist on allowing democratic parties and organisations freedom of action in 
West Gennany" and "a proportional voting system". Furthennore, the GDR 
should insist on "democratic demands" such as the right of" mass-
organisations" to nominate candidates and fonn "electoral coalitions".214 
As the Politburo revised the proposal for an all-Gennan Constituent 
Council, the scheme thoroughly changed character. To build broad support for 
a treaty with the Soviet Union, the East Gennans should strive to be co-
operative. It was fine if the GDR looked good compared with the Federal 
Republic, but it was more important to reach out to as many middle-class 
Gennans as possible. Thus, whereas the initial plan for a Constituent Council 
soughtto install East Gennany as a "standard-bearer in the fightto re-establish 
Gennan unity", 21 ' the eventual Politburo instructions ordered the SED to 
behave less like a standard-bearerand more like a cheerleader. Seductiveness 
rather than vigilance was the virtue in demand. 
A conciliatory SED campaign for German unity 
Whereas the Gennan comrades had planned to attack Bono, Moscow 
asked them to court Adenauer and the West Gennan petty bourgeoisie. In 
the fall of I 95 I, the East Gennans received orders from Moscow to evoke 
a broad Gennan demand for a peace treaty. The initial move in this cam-
paign for inter-Gennan co-operation, was the call for a meeting to discuss 
unification. Thus, on I 5 September, GDR Prime Minister Grotewohl held a 
speech in the People's Chamber and asked for an all-Gennan Constituent 
Council. Grotewohl did not mind a West Gennan majority in the Council, 
since the purpose ofthis body "would not be to vote somebody down" but to 
reconcile Gennans from East and West. "The number of participants on such a 
conference is therefore not basically important," Grotwohl declared. 216 
The Soviet Politburo ordered the Soviet high commissioner, General 
Chuikov, to support Grotewohl' smessage and emphasise that this initiative 
might bring about Gennan unification.217 In an interview on 20 September 
I 95 I, the general said the Constituent Council "could make a great contri-
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bution" because "the powers which occupy West Germany [ ... ] cannot 
disregard the opinion of the German people"."' Meanwhile, the SED 
regime rallied its resources in support of the Constituent Council. On 16 
September 1951, the National Front advocated a "fight" in West Germany 
"to fulfil the proposals of the People's Chamber"; simultaneously, the 
Communist youth organisation and the East German trade unions asked their 
Western counterparts to support the Constituent Council. 219 
The SED regime also called upon the so-called bourgeois parties to take 
part in the Constituent Council campaign. Soviet diplomats hoped to 
"activate the fight for peace and unity" both in the GDR and in West 
Germany through "a wider use" of the East German CDU.220 The East 
German "bourgeois" parties were an oddity. Their leadership had been 
purged of all but submissive politicians, their activities were strictly regu-
lated, but they were neither forbidden nor allowed to die. A team of com-
pliant "bourgeois" politicians -like Foreign Minister Georg Dertinger 
(CDU)- continued to occupy high positions in the GDR. But although in 
office, these people were not in power. The SED Politburo dictated gov-
ernment policy.'" 
Dertinger, however, sincerely believed he could advance the process of 
German unification. In October 1951, he arranged a meeting with Ems! 
Lemmer, a former East-CDU Deputy Chairman who, after having been 
purged in 194 7, moved to West Berlin where he headed the local CDU 
organisation. In a meeting with Lemmer, Dertinger claimed that "the Soviet 
Union [was] willing to pay a high price for a neutral Germany; even willing 
to disinterest themselves in Germany". In conveying this message, Dertinger 
claimed to act with the "the explicitapproval ofSemenovand Grotewoh1".222 
Nothing in the available Soviet material suggests thatDertingerwas on a 
secret mission from Moscow. The German desk's short summary of the 
Lemmer-Dertingerconversationstated only what Lemmer had told about a 
growing West German discontentwith Adenauer' s line.223 The Soviet foreign 
ministry did not trust Dertinger as a messenger. They suspected Dertinger 
of advocating German unification not to assist the Soviet Union, but as part 
of an internal struggle for power in the East-CDU. Dertinger further added 
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to the Russiansuspicionsthrough an attemptto lobby among the Russians as 
well. On 29 October 1951, the East German foreign minister told the head of 
the Soviet Diplomatic Mission in East Germany, Georgii Pushkin, that he 
hoped to elaborate "the principles of a peace treaty". Dertinger then offered to 
show Pushkin the eventual document- unofficially .224 Moscow was hyper-
sensitive about fifth columns. Hence, Gribanov advised Pushkin to "carefully 
examine all facts" about Dertinger' s activities.'25 
Although unapproved and unwanted, Dertinger's contacts with Lemmer 
turned out to be one of the Soviet Union's rare successes in influencing the 
West German CDU. Lemmer passed the information on to Adenauer's 
minister for all-German affairs, Jakob Kaiser. Unlike Lemmer, Kaiser 
believed that the Soviet Union would pay "a high price" to achieve unity; a 
few months later, when the West German cabinet met to discuss the Stalin 
note, Kaiser argued fiercely that the Stalin note was an opportunity the 
government should exploit.'" 
The East German campaign failed to rock Adenauer's opposition 
against talks with the East. Adenauer asked instead for democratic elec-
tions throughout Germany under international control.'" The Bundestag 
also passed a motion from the Social Democrats asking for a United 
Nations commission to examine the conditions for free-elections through-
out Germany."' Then, on 6 October, Adenauer accused Grotewohl of 
having "omitted from the idea of reunion the territory lying beyond the 
Oder-Neisse line". In Adenauer's opinion, a peace treaty should restore this 
territory to Germany .ll' 
Despite Adenauer' s adverse reaction, Moscow still pushed for co-
operation between Bonn and Berlin to place a German peace treaty on the 
international agenda. On I 0 October I 951, Grotewohl addressed the 
question of German unity in front of the East German parliament. "Does it 
help us to get any further by holding up to each other these different points of 
view?" he asked. "Or is it not rather an imperative necessity to sit down at one 
table in order seriously and objectively to deliberate on these things at all-
German negotiations."'" A Soviet report on the incident claimed that the 
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People's Chamber held "the majority ofthe proposals made by the Federal 
Parliament[to be] acceptable".'" 
Moscow aimed at German public opinion. In this respect, Bonn' s offer to 
discuss German elections atthe United Nations was less than ideal. According 
to Gribanov, the West used the United Nations to "bury the proposal of the 
People'sChamber".232 Unlike a debate in an all-GermanConstituentCouncil, 
discussions behind closed doors in New York would not excite the German 
public. Hence, a discussion in the United Nations was a less than ideal pretext 
for the Soviet peace treaty initiative to come. On the other hand, the Soviet 
Union wished to make an appearance of reasonableness. The Politburo 
discussed how to respond, and ordered the East Germans to support the idea 
of a commission to investigate whether Germany was ready for free elections, 
but "such an investigation could best be conducted by the Germans 
themselves" in co-operation with the four powers rather than the United 
Nations.233 
Regardless of Soviet opposition, the General Assembly voted to estab-
lish an ad hoc political commission to examine the conditions for free 
elections throughout Germany. On 4 December 1951, that commission 
decided to invite representatives from East and West Germany so that both 
parties could explain their position. The next day, UN Secretary General 
Trygve Lie forwarded an invitation to the GDR.234 The Politburo consid-
ered Lie's letter and decided to scale down the confrontation between East 
Berlin and the United Nations. Gromyko, who had written the Politburo's 
draft resolution on that issue, advised the East Germans not to appear before 
the UN commission."' The Politburo, however, decided to send an East 
German delegation to New York.'" "Fortacticalreasons,"the German 
comrades should not point out that the UN was "incompetent to consider 
the German question" .237 
Whereas Moscow pushed East Berlin to show token deference towards the 
UN and build support in Germany for the Soviet peace treaty proposal to 
come, the Soviet Union remained hesitant about making substantial sacrifices 
in order to court German public opinion. Although Gribanov argued that the 
publication of a list containing names of remaining German prisoners of 
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war in the Soviet Union could raise the West German hopes for an understand-
ing with the Soviet Union about unificationand a peace treaty, Gribanovwas 
nevertheless not allowed to proceed. 238 The Soviet sentiments about the war 
were strong, and the prevailingopinion was that Moscow did not owe Germany 
anything, not even a list of names. This Soviet sentimentwas evident in high 
commissionerChuikov' s reaction when Bishop Otto Dibelius petitioned him 
to let prisoners return: the general brusquely discarded this concern for"war 
criminals".239 
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The Stalin note of 10 March 1952 
In August 1951, the Politburo decided to allow time for a propaganda 
campaign in Germany before proceeding to reveal the Soviet offer as to 
what a peace treaty might contain. Preferably, the Kremlin would like the 
governments of both East and West Germany to plea for a peace treaty. 
When the Germans themself asked for a peace treaty, Moscow could offer 
a deal from a position of strength, not weakness. 
As the East Germans campaigned to build support for a peace treaty, the 
Soviet foreign minstry prepared a text that would satisfy the public demand 
for a treaty and put pressure on the Western powers to negotiate with the 
Soviet Union about German unification. This document, which eventually 
was published on 10 March 1952, has later become known as the Stalin 
note. 
How the Stalin note was drafted 
The challenge in drafting the Stalin note was how to maintain the Soviet 
negotiating position while compiling a document that Bonn and the Western 
powers could not refuse without being seen to sacrifice German unity. The 
first document to this end was written at the German desk, it was dated 15 
September 1951 and carried the title "basic foundations of a peace treaty 
with Germany"."" For the next six months, the form and shape of the "basic 
foundations" evolved, and the document became increasingly similar to the 
note that Gromyko handed to the French, American and British representatives 
on I 0 March 1952. 
Compared to the eventual note, the first draft was modelled less on what 
the Western public would like to hear, and devoted more to actual Soviet views 
on what a peaceful settlementwith Germany should imply. With regard to war 
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that Adenauer had inflicted, and proposed to include in a future peace treaty a 
number of passages about political freedom. Gribanov referred to legalisation 
ofCommunistactivities as Germany's obligation "to remove all hindrances to 
the rebirth and the strengthening of democratic tendencies among the German 
population". 306 Interestingly, the means Gribanov listed to prevent prosecution 
of Communists were the ideals of a liberal democracy; and he used the 
wording of article 15 in the 1947 peace treaty with Italy describe the future 
order in a united Germany:'" 
All persons, being under German jurisdiction, regardless of race, 
sex, language or religion, may enjay human rights and fUndamental 
freedoms, including freedom of speech, press and publishing, 
religious cult, political conviction and assembly. 308 
2) The second aim of the peace treaty was to assure that a united Germany 
would never allow fascism - whatsoever. Gribanov recommended that the 
peace treaty ban "the resurgence of political, military or semi-military 
fascist and militaristic organisations, whose purpose it is to deprive the 
people of its democratic rights"."' Selianinov added a Beruftverbot that 
banished all "war criminals and all active Nazi-party members who com-
mitted Nazi crimes" from "state, public or semi-public offices and public 
positions".'" Such passages, by the way, were not unique for the peace 
treaty that the Soviet diplomats elaborated in 1951. The anti-Nazi ban 
corresponded with article 17 in the peace treaty between the Allies and 
ltaly.lll 
In connection with the passages about how to avoid fascism, the Soviet 
authors mentioned the word "democratic" several times. Gribanov wished 
to "guarantee that the development of the very German state, as well as the 
political and public life of the country, is based on peace and democ-
racy".312 Selianinov'stext proposed that a peace treaty should oblige a new 
German governmentto "strengthen and continue the democratic transforma-
tions that have been achieved in Germany".313 In Soviet writing, the word 
"democratic" has a number of different connotations. It might mean the model 
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of society that existed in the German Democratic Republic or in the Soviet 
Union. Sometimes, however, "democratic"was used to describe any anti-
fascist movement. Finally, Soviet authors used democracy more or less 
synonymouslywith independence.Jn November 1947, for example, Molotov 
spoke of a "democmtic peace" as the opposite of"imperialistpeace". A 
"democratic peace" meant "full restoration ofindependence"; imperialist 
peace meant "the domination of certain strong Powers over other nations, big 
and small, without consideration for their rights and national sovereignty". To 
judge from the examples above the term democracy was sufficiently elastic to 
encompass Communism, prevention of fascism and mere sovereignty.'14 
3) The third political imperative in the schematic draft only underlines the 
second: the general politicalfreedoms of Germany must not be used to 
allow Nazi parties. There was a possible contradiction between the first 
(liberal freedoms) and the second (no Nazism) commandments. To prevent 
any ambiguity, Gribanov stressed that German authorities could not inter-
pret the political freedoms so as to permit Nazism. His text reads: 
Every action of organisations, be that political, military or 
paramilitary, and also the actions of separate individuals, 
regardless of their social position, aimed to deprive the people of its 
democratic rights, revive German militarism and fascism, or 
cultivate revanchist Ideas, should be strictly forbidden and 
persecuted by law. 315 
Non-alignment 
The schematic draft would oblige Germany "notto enter any political or 
military alliance, directed against any power that took part with its armed 
forces in the war against Germany'~. Demanding only a German obligation 
to refrain from entering alliances, the Soviet text did not mention the word 
"neturality" .Gribanov shunned the word neutrality because this was the term 
Moscow applied to those cowards who had abstained in the struggle against 
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fascism.' 16 In practice,however,neutralitywas whatthe Soviet Union asked 
for- and possibly what the German people demanded. 
The neutrality movement was a potent force in Germany. In the early years 
of the Federal Republic, neutrality and disarmament attracted people across 
the political spectre. Both utopian Socialists and members of the patriotic 
bourgeoisie preached neutrality. Arguably the most influential ofthe pro-
neutrality groups was the NauheimerCircle, founded by a West German 
professor ofhistory, Ulrich Noack, in the latter half of 1948.317 The Soviet 
foreign ministry began to take more interest in the movement in early 1951 
and translatedNoack' s pamphlet about German neutralisation.318 The professor 
advocated a united, neutral and demilitarised Germany as a buffer between the 
superpowers. Besides, neutralisation was a necessary condition for German 
unification since neither global power could allow the other full control in the 
heart ofEurope. On this point Noack delighted the Soviet foreign ministry 
with a Lenin quotation: "[He] who posesses Germany controls Europe.'"" 
The foreign ministry admitted to a "somewhat inconsistent" policy towards 
the neutrality movement in earliertimes.320 In July 1950, for example, 
Ulbricht had argued for the necessity to fight "against 'the theory of neutrality' 
which delivers the German people to the aggressors".321 Ulbrichtthought 
neutrality could impede East Germany' sorientation towards the Soviet Union 
and the people's democracies. 322 Prior to the Palais Rose Conference (March-
June 1951), however, the foreign ministry began to view the movement as an 
ally.'" 
When Gribanov and Selianinovoutlined provisions on neutrality, their main 
focus was placed on withdrawal of foreign troops from German territory. 
Gribanovrecommended that all occupation forces be withdrawn from 
Germany no later than three months after the peace treaty had been signed, 
Selianinov set the deadline for the withdrawal to "one year's time after the 
peace treaty has been concluded".'" Besides, when the two diplomats 
contemplated military provisions, they included a number of decisions to 
prevent the Germans from military co-operation with foreigners. 
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Military provisions 
Gribanov' sschematic draft allowed a Gennan army, navy and airforce, but 
rendered those forces "strictly limited in such a way as to answer only defence 
needs". The text restricted the number ofGennan soldiers, fighter planes, 
transport aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces, etc. Gennan bomber planes, missiles, 
weapons of mass destruction (atomic, nuclear, bacteriological)and most 
ordinary fortifications were to be banned, and there would be restrictions on 
the extent of compulsory military training and Gennany' s ability to provide 
others with military assistance; the text forbade Gennan scientists from 
participating in military research or production abroad, it outlawed any 
Gennan foreign legion, and it forbade Gennans from serving in foreign 
armies."' Besides, the schematic draft proposed to ban all production of 
"arms, military ammunition and warequipmenf' and renderGennany 
dependent on others to provide weapons."' 
Gribanov' scolleague, Selianinov ,on the the other hand, proposed to ban 
every trace of the Gennan military establishment (defence ministry, officer 
corps, institutionalised mobilisation, general staff). He allowed "a merchant 
navy and a fleet of civilian aircraft" to serve the needs of"a peace economy". 
Besides, to "secure the internal public order of the country and the guarding of 
the borders" Gennany might "employ police forces in limited numbers (150-
200 thousand people), with hand guns." This police force should be forbidden 
from employing fonner active Nazis and fonner members of the Gestapo, the 
SS (Schutzstaffil) and the SA (Sturmabteilung)."' 
· In short, Gribanovwouldallow a Gennanmilitaryestablishment,but 
impose a number of limitations; Selianinov would forbid a Gennan military 
establishment, but allow a few exceptions. The Stalin note sided with 
Gribanov. The note even allowed Gennanyto produce war materials for 
domestic needs- but not for export."' When Gromyko gave Molotov a brief 
on these issues, he suggested Gennan armed forces roughly equal to those of 
Italy."' Atthat time, the Western powers honoured the punitive clauses in the 
Italian peace treaty that restricted the country's armed forces to 250,000 
men with a limited weaponry.'" 
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Economic provisions 
A number of sections in the schematic draft and the treaty text concerned the 
Gennan economy. The Soviet interests that mattered, however, were only 
three: to prevent an economic structure that would breed fascism, to prevent 
exclusive Western access to Gennan resources, and to take as much goods and 
money as possible for use in the Soviet economy. Sovietisation ofthe Gennan 
economy was not a priority. 
1) The German economy should not breed fascism. Gribanov recom-
mended what he called "a democratic transfonnation of the industry, 
agriculture and other branches of the [Gennan] economy".331 This could 
mean a Sovietisation of the Gennan economy,"' but the subsequent 
measures that Gribanov asked for suggested a more humble goal: Gribanov 
hoped to undo "Gennan cartels, trusts, syndicates and other monopolistic 
associations""' because of their capacity to breed fascism and militarism. 
To demolish the cartels was not synonymous with Communism; as late as 
1950, London and Paris pursued a policy of dismantling Gennan cartels.'" 
Besides, a mighty Gennany was simply not advisable. A peace treaty 
should "prevent the resurrection of the [Gennan] military-industrial poten-
. . f . "ill tial and the elimination of excesstve concentratmns o economtc power . 
Apart from dismantling cartels, the Gennan desk hoped to write into the 
peace treaty a set of redistribution policies. The motivation behind this 
policy was neither social conscience nor an urge to Sovietise Gennany. 
Rather Gribanov sought to reduce the power base of notorious Nazis and 
calm the revanchist sentiments of those Gennans who had fled from their 
properties east of Oder-Neisse. To this end, Gribanov proposed a "transfer 
of assets from war and nazi criminals to the hands of the Gennan people, land 
refonn, etc. "336 Selianinov added that the "Gennan authorities are obliged to 
created nonnal conditions oflivelihood" for those who had resettled in the 
Western parts ofGennany .337 
IfGribanov could crush Gennan cartels, and preferably calm the refugees, 
he could accept a treaty that allowed competitive capitalism in Gennany. The 
leader of the Gennan desk tried to state this frankly in the schematic draft: 
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Determine that the development of the peacefol branches of 
industry, agriculture, external trade and other branches of the 
economy may proceed without any limitations or hindrances on 
behalf of the Allied and United Powers. 338 
If we return to the drafting of the Stalin note, the promise of a free economy 
was a central theme in the Soviet message to the West German population. The 
Stalin note promised, that "no kind oflimitations" would be imposed upon the 
G " ful " erman peace economy -an economy that must "contribute to welfare 
growth" for the German people."' In early December 1951, probably on 
Deputy Foreign Minister V aleriiZorin' s advice, the German desk actually 
suggested writing into the Stalin note a promise to "secure the unrestrained 
developmentof private initiative and entrepreneurship". 340 This passage, that 
failed to make it through the drafting process, reveals a Soviet dilemma: if 
Moscow were explicit about its intentions to allow capitalism, the text would 
not only exclude Communism, but exclude a numberofSocial Democratic 
policies as well. 
2) The second economic imperative was to prevent the Western powers 
from making exclusive use of the German economic potential. The solution 
that Gribanov and Selianinov proposed was free trade - a suggestion that 
came naturally from Moscow's perceptions of forced trade as an American 
measure to exploit the German economy. No later than three to six months 
after the signing of the peace treaty, the occupation powers should remove all 
.restrictions on trade with Germany and terminate their exclusive economic 
rights in the country. The re unified state was free to trade with everybody, as 
long as the govemmentobserveda most-favoured-nationregime and treated 
all trade partners equally. Germany, furthermore, should not grant any country 
exclusive rights to lend or lease commercial aircraft and other equipment.'" 
3) Several large sections in the schematic draft and the treaty text outlined 
how Moscow should secure war reparations for the Soviet economy. Since 
Germany was guiltyofinitiatingthe Second World War, she should 
"compensate the losses inflicted through military actions [ ... ] and occupation 
ofterritory".'" To compensate Soviet and Polish losses during the war, 
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Selianinov demanded goods and services for a total of 6,829 million 
dollars in 1938 prices. If we take inflation into account, Selianinov asked for 
]5, 400 million 1951 dollars.343 This sum was roughly equal to the total 
amount granted by the United States in Marshal! aid (1948-1952), or 30 per 
cent of the West German gross domestic product in 1950.344 Gribanov and 
Selianinov foresaw a 20-year period of down payment. 
The sections about war reparations were the most refined ones in the work 
of the German desk. The authors copied the technicalities from the Italian 
peace treaty and added some extra punitive clauses to prevent the German 
government from keeping any property that was seized during the war and 
from nationalising or taxing Allied property in Germany.345 The treaty text 
stated that "German obligations regarding reparations take priority over all 
other obligations". Hence, the reunified country could not use other 
obligations in the treaty, for example her obligation to care for settlers from 
• 346 Eastern Europe, as a pretext not to pay war reparatmns. 
Provisions regarding German sovereignty 
A crucial issue was how the Soviet Union could hope to control the 
continued implementation of a peace treaty. Selianinov's treaty text outlined 
a four-power control regime.'47 Although every country that took part in 
the war against Germany would be invited to sign the peace treaty, only the 
great powers should oversee "questions concerning fulfilment and interpre-
tation of the peace treaty". 348 If the great powers claimed Germany violated 
the peace treaty, then the matter should first be referred to a conciliation 
commission. If consultations failed, the parties should rely on arbitration. 
Selianinov did not describe how to appoint an arbitrator.349 
For the Ruhr area, homeland of the notorious German cartels, Selianinov 
foresaw a "special organ" made up of representatives from Germany, the four 
great powers, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Benelux. To make sure the 
Ruhr industries served "peace purposes only", this commission should 
oversee the elimination of armaments industries, divide cartels and trusts in 
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cartels and trusts in the area, and nationalise the successor companies.350 
This section about the Ruhr was the only part of the treaty text that 
mentioned nationalisation of German industries. 
Selianinov proposed one four-power commission to oversee reparations 
and one to oversee demilitarisation. The demilitarisation commission could 
"conduct inspections of any object in Germany at any time" and require 
any information it deemed necessary. The aim was not only to prevent 
Germany from equipping military forces, but also to check the German 
production of "metals, chemical products, machines and [ ... ] other items 
that might be used directly for military purposes".351 
If Germany violated the decisions of the control commissions, the four 
powers should place "political and economic sanctions" on the country 
"according to agreement". Selianinov was particularly anxious to avoid 
German militarism. Thus, if Germany broke its obligations in Ruhr, or if 
Germany broke the military provisions of the treaty, then the four powers 
must "reserve [for themselves] the right to send troops into [a territory] that 
resembles the former zones of occupation". In due time, however, the four 
powers could reconsider the control regime. 352 
The schematic draft and the treaty text contained a number of sections 
apart from those mentioned above, but these have mostly technical and 
juridical interest, such as a part on how to renew treaties with Germany from 
before the war. Another section stipulated a special regime to keep open the 
port of Hamburg and navigation on certain German rivers. Germany, of course, 
would have to recognise the post-war borders as they de facto existed in the 
early 1950s. The country must keep convicted war criminals in prison and 
extradite foreign citizens accused of "treason or co-operation with the 
enemy",35J 
The role of perceptions in the peace treaty proposals 
When Gribanov sat down to formulate his idea of a peace treaty with Germany, 
perceptions guided his pen. The leader of the German desk formed the Soviet 
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negotiating position as if the Federal Republic were a country.w~ere 
aggressive monopolies were aboutto oppress small-scal.e capitalism, where 
political persecution was commonplace, and where foreign troops ruled the 
country and exploited the population by way oftrade. Due to these 
perceptions, any bargaining between Moscow and the Western powers about a 
German peace treaty could easily have turned out to be somewhat absurd. 
What the Western powers would consider a Soviet concession, Moscow 
would consider a demand- and vice versa. 
Ironically, Gribanov's thoroughly hostile and negative view of the West 
emboldened him to plan a peace treaty that might have been acceptable to a 
majority of the West Germans on most issues. When Gribanov wrote about 
the need to secure political freedoms in a united Germany, for example, he 
did not think of this as a surrender, but rather a prerequisite. Moscow, we 
must remember, exaggerated Adenauer's repression of the Communists. 
When Gribanov insisted on the rights of man in Germany, he did so in the 
belief that Adenauer could not militarise the country without violating these 
freedoms. 
Likewise, when Moscow insisted that a united Germany be allowed to trade 
freely, the Soviet diplomats acted on a beliefthat trade in Western ~urope was 
forced, not free, and distorted to serve the political purpose of armmg the 
Atlantic alliance.ln this perspective, the demand that a united Germany should 
practice free trade was not a Soviet concession, but a Soviet demand. By 
insisting on free trade, Gribanovthought he was dealing a blow to the 
American exploitation of Western Germany; he sincerely believed that 
Germany, when liberated from the American occupation troops and their 
proteges, would just as readily trade with the Soviet Union as the West 
Germans presently did with the United States. 
The economic provisions in the two peace treaty drafts cannot be fully 
understood without taking into account the Soviet idea of how a capitalist 
economy develops. If monopolies were left unconstrained, they would a~in 
breed imperialism,revanchism, militarism and war- as they had done twice. 
before. Since Soviet diplomats believed that fascism presupposes monopolies 
as a child presupposes a mother, Gribanov hoped the destruction of all German 
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monopolies would prevent a nazi resurrection in the future. The need to avoid 
a new security threat against the Soviet Union, not any desire to assist the 
incompetent West German Communists, explains the various proposals in the 
peace treaty drafts that call for democratisation of the German economy. 
Likewise, on a few occasions Selianinov and Gribanov mentioned the need for 
economic redistribution, but their goal was not to create a Socialist society, 
but to prevent social discontent, particularly among the settlers that had fled 
from Eastern Europe. Such discontent, Moscow reasoned, could provoke 
revanchism. 
The Stalin note vs. the actual Soviet bargaining position 
Selianinov' streaty text and Gribanov' s schematic draft of the foundations for a 
peace treaty with Germany both aimed to sketch the Soviet position in 
possible negotiations with the Western powers. Being ordinary diplomats, 
neither Selianinov nor Gribanov could afford to be generous on behalf of the 
Soviet Union. Their suggestions, were therefore likely to resemble the Soviet 
maximum position on a German peace treaty. 
If we compare the Soviet peace treaty aspirations with the suggestions 
in the Soviet note of I 0 March 1952, we find that the Stalin note was rife with 
omissions, but not with lies. In a hypothetical bargaining situation, Moscow 
mighthaveacceptedaunited,capitalistandnon·communistGermany. 
Moscow did not, however, intend to give the German state much sovereignty. 
Selianinovand Gribanovplanned the return of war reparations, the dismantling 
ofindustries and great power privileges. For the West Germans, the peace 
treaty regime would resemble the occupation regime 1945-49, albeit without 
the presence of occupation troops. 
The numerous restraints that Moscow hoped to place upon Germany 
confirm that the Soviet Union expected the future regime in Germany to 
resemble a bourgeois democracy. These restraints must mean that Mos-
cow viewed a united Germany as a potential enemy rather than a potential 
ally. If given a free hand in Germany, the Russians would not hesitate to 
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introduce socialism - but the Soviet hand in Germany was forced, not free. 
Unable to obtain an ideal solution, the Soviet priority was to prevent a 
future German military threat, not to expand the East German model to 
Western Germany; the Soviet appetite for socialism, could not subdue the fear 
of German militarism. Hence, the peace treaty provisions that aimed to 
prevent Nazism were many and absolute, and the suggestions that could 
impose socialism from above were few and vague. The need to contain 
Germany, not socialism through Machiavellian tactics, explain the contents of 
Gribanov's and Selianinov'stexts. 
On a number of occasions, the German desk used the peace treaty with 
Italy as a model for its work. Italy, like Germany, had a prehistory of 
fascism. In 1947, the great powers signed a peace treaty with Italy that 
guaranteed political freedoms and ended the Western occupation of that 
country - whereupon Communism prospered. Possibly, Soviet diplomats 
hoped the developmentin Germany would resemble the development in Italy. 
At least, the peace treaty schemes contained a number ofliberal guarantees 
that would allow the German Communist party to grow, prosper and prevail-
when the forces ofhistory permitted. The German desk did not, however, care 
to secure the Communists any prominent role in German politics, for example 
by imposingcoalitiongovernmentsupon a united Germany. 
The internal planning work in the Soviet foreign ministry was broadly in 
agreement with the Stalin note. Both the Stalin note and the Soviet peace 
treaty schemes explicitly forbade the presence of foreign troops. Germany 
was to be neutral, and lightly armed. On this point, the various internal papers 
vary somewhat. The treaty text prepared by Selianinovpropose only a German 
police force with hand guns. Gribanov' sschematic draft allowed Germany 
armed forces with a strength roughly equal to those ofltaly. With regard to 
economic principles, the internal papers 9onfirm that Moscow was ready to 
accept a capitalist model for a united Germany. The German economy, 
however, would be restrained by war reparations. A wide range of products 
would be banned, and three control commissions would retain far-reaching 
authority. 
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Conclusions: Two tracks of Soviet 
foreign policy 
Atthe onset of the cold war, the United States stopped treating West Germany 
as a foe and began to look atthe country as an ally. At least from 194 7, 
Washington aimed to revitalise the German economy. Two years later, in 
1949, the three Western zones of occupation were granted statehood and 
became the Federal Republic of Germany. Still, West Germany was no 
ordinary country. Bonn had no army, and the occupation powers enjoyed 
vaguely defined, but essentially limitless, privileges. In legal terms, the 
Federal Republic was occupied territory. 
Then, in the aftermath of the North Korean attack on South Korea, the 
Western powers agreed to let the Federal Republic rearm and prepared to 
make the country a regular member of the Atlantic Alliance. In return for 
Bonn' s co-operation, the Western powers agreed to lift the remaining 
restrictions on West German heavy industry and grant the Federal Republic 
full sovereignty - within the framework of European integration. These 
developments would inevitably undo the Potsdam agreement and with it the 
Soviet Union's hope for war reparations. Worse, German soldiers would 
again confront the Red Army. 
The urgency that Soviet observers felt about Germany is explained, not 
by facts alone, but by the distorted lens through which Moscow observed 
the developments in the Federal Republic. Moscow saw the German 
economic miracle as part of an arms build-up, and Soviet diplomats were 
convinced that the monopolistic Ruhr industries carried the seeds of 
revanchism, fascism and imperialism. Besides, the European integration 
process allegedly gave the United States direct control over many aspects 
of West German society. 
In responding to the danger of German soldiers, the Soviet Union pursued 
two different strategies. One was advocated by Soviet diplomacy and involved 
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some kind of understanding with the Western powers; the other was 
spearheaded by East German Communists, embraced the Sovietisation of the 
Eastern zone and the struggle against Bonn and the Western powers. Stalin 
wavered between the two strategies; he failed to co-ordinate different policy 
initiatives and left confusion and disarray. 
Detour Palais Rose 
When first confronted with the danger of German soldiers, Moscow's 
response was to demand that the great powers maintain status quo in 
Germany and refrain from arming the country. Moscow wasted the winter 
of 1950 and the spring of 1951 with one long, head-on attack against a 
future German army. At the Palais Rose Conference (March-June 1951), 
Moscow challenged the Western powers to respect the Potsdam agree-
ment; meanwhile, East Berlin arranged meetings and collected signatures 
against remilitarisation. 
The Soviet strategy backfired. Although there was indeed discontent 
with rearmament both in the Federal Republic and among America's 
European allies, Moscow failed to exploit the opportunities. Rather, the 
direct and aggressive Soviet approach served to convince the Western 
powers about the need to rearm Germany. 
Moscow considers unification and a treaty on Germany 
The failure of the Palais Rose Conference brought about a shift in Soviet 
strategy. In the summer of 1951, as the Western powers moved undeterred 
to establish a European army and grant the Federal Republic sovereignty, 
the German desk proposed that the Soviet Union, irrespective of what the 
other great powers aimed to do, should elaborate the text of a peace treaty 
with Germany, excite the West German public and enter negotiations with 
the Western powers on how to solve the German problem. 
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Within the Soviet foreign ministry, Gribanov and the German desk were 
responsible for administering Soviet relations with the Western powers 
over Germany. Although Gribanov worked in a minefield of conflicting 
interests, his work showed a surprising consequence; he repeatedly tried to 
convince his superiors that a peace treaty with Germany could solve the Soviet 
Union's problems. The German desk continued to employ the logic of the 
Potsdam agreement and sought co-operation among the great powers to keep 
Germany down. 
In advocatinga peace treaty, Gribanovsoughtsecurity, not revolution. His 
department, the German desk, produced a couple of unfinished peace treaty 
drafts that reveal how Soviet diplomats aimed to secure iron-clad guarantees 
against a Nazi revival and German militarism. The plans did not, however, 
include any strategy to place Communists in political positions or secure state 
ownership of German industries. Gribanovused Italy rather then the GDR as 
model for a united Germany, and he hoped to impose on Germany the same 
kind of punitive clauses that the wartime Allies had placed on Italy in I 94 7. 
Furthermore, Gribanov hoped to secure high war reparations, German non-
alignment and far-reaching privileges for the four great powers. The foreseen 
regime to keep Germany demilitarised under supervision by a control 
commission would strictly limit German sovereignty. 
To avoid unnecessary opposition in the West against negotiations, the 
foreign ministry decided to launch, not the full text of a peace treaty, but a 
document called "the foundations for a peace treaty with Germany". This 
document has since become known as the Stalin note of I 0 March I 952. 
The note reflected the Soviet idea of a peace treaty, but presumably unpopular 
suggestions about war reparations and four-powerprivileges in a united 
Germany were removed. 
In the fall of I 95 I, the Politburo approved ofGribanov' s peace treaty 
strategy, but not without second thoughts. The Kremlin was haunted by 
the hard and unyielding Soviet strategy at the Palais Rose. For fear that the 
Western powers would interpret a new Soviet peace treaty proposal as a 
retreat and, consequently, a sign of weakness, the Politburo ordered a broad 
public campaign in Germany. The purpose of this campaign was to create a 
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demand in the West German populationfornegotiations with Moscow. When 
this demand was sufficiently strong, the Soviet Union could offer to discuss a 
peace treaty, and the move would appear, not as a retreat in the face of a 
determined Western policy, but as a generous Soviet concession to the 
German people. 
Waiter Ulbricht's mutiny 
On Moscow's orders, the East German Communists spentthe autumn of 195 I 
trying to tempt Adenauerto join in the plea for a peace treaty. East Berlin had 
standing orders to behave in a conciliatory way, avoid confrontationand stage 
the broadest possible German appeal for a peace treaty. Time and again, the 
SED leadership courted Bonn- only to be rejected by Adenauer. By January 
1952, Ulbrichtran out of patience and proposed a change in tactics: he wanted 
to attack the Adenauer regime and the General Agreement. Ulbricht preferred 
to use the peace treaty as a battle cry. His hopes were to unite the national idea 
with the idea of socialism, and help spread the East German model of society 
to all of Germany. 
Waiter Ulbricht was a man of tremendous zeal. Having escaped Hitler's 
persecution, he fled to Moscow, and - as one of not to many exiled Commu-
nists, he escaped Stalin's purges as well. His life was a long stubborn fight for 
revolution, the Soviet Union and Communism."4 Ulbrichtmighthave hoped 
for unification, and many SED officials indeed believed in unification well 
into the 1960s,"' but he never mixed his priorities: national unity was only 
Ulbricht' s second priority, socialism his first. Like Colonel Tiulpanov before 
him, who ran the political life in the Soviet Zone of Occupation until1949, 
Ulbricht anticipated the division of Germany and acted upon it.'" Later in life, 
he spearheaded the construction of the Berlin wall and built "socialism in half 
acountry".357 
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Two lines of policy collide 
Occasionally, Ulbricht's policies conflicted with the intentions ofhis Soviet 
masters. The memoirs of Vladimir Semenov, for example, confirm that the 
SED general secretary pushed for socialism and that the Soviet foreign 
ministry tried to restrain him. 358 This study, as well, has touched several 
internal disputes that occurred as Waiter Ulbricht stepped onto the turf of 
Mikhail Gribanov and the Soviet foreign ministry. 
A first controversy was caused by the East German attempts to widen their 
field of competence. In their eagerness to help Moscow, the SED leaders-
consciously or not- preferred actions that added to the sovereignty and 
prestige of East Berlin. In the autumn of 1950, for example, Dertinger 
proposed calling a conference of Soviet-bloc foreign ministers (the Prague 
Conference) not least because his government needed recognition and a place 
to show the flag. 
The Soviet foreign ministry, on the other hand, carefully guarded the 
Potsdam agreement. The German desk opposed the East German attempts 
to enter parts of the field where only great powers should tread. When East 
Berlin proposed to undo this or the other part of the Potsdam agreement, 
the German desk reacted strongly- sometimes leaving the impression that 
Soviet diplomats identified themselves with the Allies of the Second World 
War rather than with their Communist brethren in East Berlin. Indeed, a 
Russian historian, Aleksei Filitov, sees the Stalin note as a Soviet effort to 
frighten the GDR establishment and make sure they stayed loyal to Moscow.'" 
Control in the Eastern zone was certainly a Soviet objective, but notthe only 
one. 
A second disagreement between the German desk and East Berlin 
concerned which tactics to apply against German militarisation. The Soviet 
foreign ministry hoped to solve Moscow's troubles by way of.diplomacy; 
the SED hoped to confront the West with manifestations and campaigns. 
Ulbricht and Gribanov were different personalities. Individual conviction 
may have played a role in their choice of tactics, but we may as well point 
at institutional factors. Bureaucracies everywhere, in East Berlin, Washington 
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thatAdenauer had inflicted, and proposed to include in a future peace treaty a 
number of passages about political freedom. Gribanov referred to legalisation 
of Communist activities as Germany's obligation "to remove all hindrances to 
the rebirth and the strengthening of democratic tendencies among the German 
population" .306 Interestingly,the means Gribanov listed to prevent prosecution 
of Communists were the ideals of a liberal democracy; and he used the 
wording of article 15 in the 1947 peace treaty with Italy describe the future 
order in a united Germany:'" 
All persons, being under German jurisdiction, regardless of race, 
sex, language or religion, may enjoy human rights and fUndamental 
freedoms, including freedom of speech, press and publishing, 
religious cult, political conviction and assembly. 308 
2) The second aim of the peace treaty was to assure that a united Germany 
would never allow fascism - whatsoever. Gribanov recommended that the 
peace treaty ban "the resurgence of political, military or semi-military 
fascist and militaristic organisations, whose purpose it is to deprive the 
people of its democmtic rights"."' Selianinov added a Beruftverbot that 
banished all "war criminals and all active Nazi-party members who com-
mitted Nazi crimes" from "state, public or semi-public offices and public 
positions".'" Such passages, by the way, were not unique for the peace 
treaty that the Soviet diplomats elaborated in 1951. The anti-Nazi ban 
corresponded with article 17 in the peace treaty between the Allies and 
Italy.'" 
In connection with the passages about how to avoid fascism, the Soviet 
authors mentioned the word "democratic" several times. Gribanov wished 
to "guarantee that the development of the very German state, as well as the 
political and public life of the country, is based on peace and democ-
racy". 312 Selianinov' stext proposed that a peace treaty should oblige a new 
German govemmentto "strengthen and continue the democratic transforma-
tions that have been achieved in Germany".313 In Soviet writing, the word 
"democratic" has a number of different connotations. It might mean the model 
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of society that existed in the Gennan Democratic Republic or in the Soviet 
Union. Sometimes, however, "democratic"was used to describe any anti-
fascist movement. Finally, Soviet authors used democracy more or less 
synonymouslywith independence.ln November 194 7, for example, Molotov 
spoke of a "democratic peace" as the opposite of"imperialistpeace". A 
"democratic peace" meant "full restoration ofindependence"; imperialist 
peace meant "the domination of certain strong Powers over other nations, big 
and small, withoutconsiderationfortheirrights and national sovereignty". To 
judge from the examples above the tenn democracy was sufficiently elastic to 
encompass Communism, prevention of fascism and mere sovereignty.'" 
3) The third political imperative in the schematic draft only underlines the 
second: the general politicalfreedoms of Germany must not be used to 
allow Nazi parties. There was a possible contradiction between the first 
(liberal freedoms) and the second (no Nazism) commandments. To prevent 
any ambiguity, Gribanov stressed that Gennan authorities could not inter-
pret the political freedoms so as to pennit Nazism. His text reads: 
Every action of organisations, be that political, military or 
paramilitary, and also the actions of separate individuals, 
regardless of their social position, aimed to deprive the people of its 
democratic rights, revive German militarism and fascism, or 
cultivate revanchist ideas, should be strictly forbidden and 
persecuted by law. 315 
Non-alignment 
The schematic draft would oblige Gennany "not to enter any political or 
military alliance, directed against any power that took part with its anned 
forces in the war against Gennany'~. Demanding only a Gennan obligation 
to refrain from entering alliances, the Soviet text did not mention the word 
"neturality" .Gribanov shunned the word neutrality because this was the tenn 
Moscow applied to those cowards who had abstained in the struggle against 
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fascism."' In practice, however, neutrality was what the Soviet Union asked 
for- and possibly whatthe Gennan people demanded. 
The neutrality movement was a potent force in Gennany. In the early years 
of the Federal Republic, neutrality and disannamentattracted people across 
the political spectre. Both utopian Socialists and members ofthe patriotic 
bourgeoisie preached neutrality. Arguably the most influential of the pro-
neutrality groups was the NauheimerCircle, founded by a West Gennan 
professor ofhistory, Ulrich Noack, in the latter half of 1948.317 The Soviet 
foreign ministry began to take more interest in the movement in early 1951 
and translatedNoack' s pamphlet aboutGennan neutralisation."' The professor 
advocated a united, neutral and demilitarisedGennany as a buffer between the 
superpowers. Besides, neutralisation was a necessary condition for Gennan 
unification since neither global power could allow the other full control in the 
heart ofEurope. On this point Noack delighted the Soviet foreign ministry 
with a Lenin quotation: "[He] who posesses Gennany controls Europe.'"" 
The foreign ministry admitted to a "somewhat inconsistent" policy towards 
the neutrality movement in earlier times. 320 In July 1950, for example, 
Ulbricht had argued for the necessity to fight "against 'the theory of neutrality' 
which delivers the Gennan people to the aggressors".321 Ulbrichtthought 
neutrality could impede East Gennany' s orientation towards the Soviet Union 
and the people's democracies."' Prior to the Palais Rose Conference (March-
June !951 ), however, the foreign ministry began to view the movement as an 
ally."' 
When Gribanov and Selianinovoutlined provisions on neutrality, their main 
focus was placed on withdrawal of foreign troops from Gennan territory. 
Gribanov recommended that all occupation forces be withdrawn from 
Gennany no later than three months after the peace treaty had been signed, 
Selianinov setthe deadline for the withdrawal to "one year's time after the 
peace treaty has been concluded".324 Besides, when the two diplomats 
contemplated military provisions, they included a number of decisions to 
prevent the Gennans from military co-operation with foreigners. 
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Military provisions 
Gribanov' sschematic dmft allowed a German army, navy and airforce, but 
rendered those forces "strictly limited in such a way as to answer only defence 
needs". The text restricted the number of German soldiers, fighter planes, 
transport aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces, etc. German bomber planes, missiles, 
weapons of mass destruction (atomic, nuclear, bacteriological)and most 
ordinary fortifications were to be banned, and there would be restrictions on 
the extent of compulsory military training and Germany's ability to provide 
others with military assistance; the text forbade German scientists from 
participating in military research or production abroad, it outlawed any 
German foreign legion, and it forbade Germans from serving in foreign 
armies."' Besides, the schematic draft proposed to ban all production of 
"arms, military ammunition and war equipmenf' and render Germany 
dependent on others to provide weapons. 326 
Gribanov'scolleague, Selianinov,on the the other hand, proposed to ban 
every trace ofthe German military establishment (defence ministry, officer 
corps, institutionalised mobilisation, general staff). He allowed "a merchant 
navy and a fleet of civilian aircraft" to serve the needs of"a peace economy". 
Besides, to "secure the internal public order of the country and the guarding of 
the borders" Germany might "employ police forces in limited numbers (I 50-
200 thousand people), with hand guns." This police force should be forbidden 
from employing former active Nazis and former members of the Gestapo, the 
SS (Schutzstaffel) and the SA (Sturmabteilung)."' 
· In short, Gribanovwould allow a German military establishment, but 
impose a number oflimitations; Selianinov would forbid a German military 
establishment, but allow a few exceptions. The Stalin note sided with 
Gribanov. The note even allowed Germany to produce war materials for 
domestic needs- but not for export."' When Gromyko gave Molotov a brief 
on these issues, he suggested German armed forces roughly equal to those of 
Italy."' Atthattime, the Western powers honoured the punitive clauses in the 
Italian peace treaty that restricted the country's armed forces to 250,000 
men with a limited weaponry .330 
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Economic provisions 
A number of sections in the schematic draft and the treaty text concerned the 
German economy. The Soviet interests that mattered, however, were only 
three: to prevent an economic structure that would breed fascism, to prevent 
exclusive Western access to German resources, and to take as much goods and 
money as possible for use in the Soviet economy. Sovietisation ofthe German 
economy was not a priority. 
1) The German economy should not breed fascism. Gribanov recom-
mended what he called "a democratic transformation of the industry, 
l " m Th" Id agriculture and other branches of the [German economy . IS cou 
mean a Sovietisation of the German economy,332 but the subsequent 
measures that Gribanov asked for suggested a more humble goal: Gribanov 
hoped to undo "German cartels, trusts, syndicates and. other mo~o.pol_istic 
associations"333 because of their capacity to breed fasCism and militarism. 
To demolish the cartels was not synonymous with Communism; as late as 
1950, London and Paris pursued a policy of dismantling German cartels.'" 
Besides, a mighty Germany was simply not advisable. A peace treaty 
should "prevent the resurrection of the [German] military-industrial poten-
. f . "335 tial and the elimination of excessive concentratiOns o economic power . 
Apart from dismantling cartels, the German desk hoped to write into the 
peace treaty a set of redistribution policies. The motivati_on_ behind this 
policy was neither social conscience nor an urge to Sovietise Germany. 
Rather Gribanov sought to reduce the power base of notorious Nazis and 
calm the revanchist sentiments of those Germans who had fled from their 
properties east of Oder-Neisse. To this end, Gribanov proposed a "transfer 
of assets from war and nazi criminals to the hands of the German people, land 
reform, etc."336 Selianinov added that the "German authorities are obliged to 
created normal conditions oflivelihood" for those who had resettled in the 
WesternpartsofGermany.337 
IfGribanov could crush German cartels, and preferably calm the refugees, 
he could accept a treaty that allowed competitive capitalism in Germany. The 
leader of the German desk tried to state this frankly in the schematic draft: 
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Determine that the development of the peacefUl branches of 
industry, agriculture, external trade and other branches of the 
economy may proceed without any limitations or hindrances on 
behalf of the Allied and United Powers. 338 
If we return to the drafting of the Stalin note, the promise of a free economy 
was a central theme in the Soviet message to the West German population. The 
Stalin note promised, that "no kind oflimitations"would be imposed upon the 
German "peaceful economy"- an economythatmust"contributeto welfare 
growth" for the German people."' In early December I 95 I, probably on 
Deputy Foreign Minister V aleriiZorin' s advice, the German desk actually 
suggested writing into the Stalin note a promise to "secure the unrestrained 
developmentof private initiative and entrepreneurship". 340 This passage, that 
failed to make itthrough the drafting process, reveals a Soviet dilemma: if 
Moscow were explicit about its intentions to allow capitalism, the text would 
not only exclude Communism, but exclude a numberofSocial Democratic 
policies as well. 
2) The second economic imperative was to prevent the Western powers 
from making exclusive use of the German economic potential. The solution 
that Gribanov and Selianinov proposed was free trade - a suggestion that 
came naturally from Moscow's perceptions of forced trade as an American 
measure to exploitthe German economy. No later than three to six months 
after the signing of the peace treaty, the occupation powers should remove all 
_restrictions on trade with Germany and terminate their exclusive economic 
rights in the coun!fY. The re unified state was free to trade with everybody, as 
long as the government observed a most-favoured-nationregime and treated 
all trade partners equally. Germany, furthermore, should not grant any coun!fY 
exclusive rights to lend or lease commercial aircraft and other equipment."' 
3) Several large sections in the schematic draft and the treaty text outlined 
how Moscow should secure war reparations for the Soviet economy. Since 
Germany was guiltyofinitiatingthe Second World War, she should 
"compensate the losses inflicted through military actions [ ... ] and occupation 
ofterritory". 342 To compensate Soviet and Polish losses during the war, 
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Selianinov demanded goods and services for a total of 6,829 million 
dollars in 1938 prices. If we take inflation into account, Seiianinov asked for 
15,400 million 1951 dollars.'" This sum was roughly equal to the total 
amount granted by the United States in Marshall aid (1948-1952), or 30 per 
cent of the West German gross domestic product in 1950.344 Gribanov and 
Selianinov foresaw a 20-year period of down payment. 
The sections about war reparations were the most refined ones in the work 
of the German desk. The authors copied the technicalities from the Italian 
peace treaty and added some extra punitive clauses to prevent the German 
government from keeping any property that was seized during the war and . 
from nationalising or taxing Allied property in Germany. 345 The treaty text 
stated that "German obligations regarding reparations take priority over all 
other obligations". Hence, the reunified coun!fY could not use other 
obligations in the treaty, for example her obligation to care for settlers from 
Eastern Europe, as a pretext not to pay war reparations. 346 
Provisions regarding German sovereignty 
A crucial issue was how the Soviet Union could hope to control the 
continued implementation of a peace treaty. Selianinov's treaty text outlined 
a four-power control regime.347 Although every countrY that took part in 
the war against Germany would be invited to sign the peace treaty, only the 
great powers should oversee "questions concerning fulfilment and interpre-
tation of the peace treaty". 348 If the great powers claimed Germany violated 
the peace treaty, then the matter should first be referred to a conciliation 
commission. If consultations failed, the parties should rely on arbitration. 
Selianinov did not describe how to appoint an arbitrator.349 
For the Ruhr area, homeland of the notorious German cartels, Selianinov 
foresaw a "special organ" made up of representatives from Germany, the four 
great powers, Poland, Czechoslovllkia and the Benelux. To make sure the 
Ruhr industries served "peace purposes only", this commission should 
oversee the elimination of armaments industries, divide cartels and trusts in 
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cartels and trusts in the area, and nationalise the successor companies."" 
This section about the Ruhr was the only part of the treaty text that 
mentioned nationalisation of German industries. 
Selianinov proposed one four-power commission to oversee reparations 
and one to oversee demilitarisation. The demilitarisation commission could 
"conduct inspections of any object in Germany at any time" and require 
any information it deemed necessary. The aim was not only to prevent 
Germany from equipping military forces, but also to check the German 
production of "metals, chemical products, machines and [ ... ] other items 
that might be used directly for military purposes".'" 
If Germany violated the decisions of the control commissions, the four 
powers should place "political and economic sanctions" on the country 
"according to agreement". Selianinov was particularly anxious to avoid 
German militarism. Thus, if Germany broke its obligations in Ruhr, or if 
Germany broke the military provisions of the treaty, then the four powers 
must "reserve [for themselves] the right to send troops into [a territory] that 
resembles the former zones of occupation". In due time, however, the four 
powers could reconsider the control regime.'" 
The schematic draft and the treaty text contained a number of sections 
apart from those mentioned above, but these have mostly technical and 
juridical interest, such as a part on how to renew treaties with Germany from 
before the war. Another section stipulated a special regime to keep open the 
port of Hamburg and navigation on certain German rivers. Germany, of course, 
would have to recognise the post-war borders as they de facto existed in the 
early 1950s. The country must keep convicted war criminals in prison and 
extradite foreign citizens accused of "treason or co-operation with the 
enemy".353 
The role of perceptions in the peace treaty proposals 
When Gribanov sat down to formulate his idea of a peace treaty with Germany, 
perceptions guided his pen. The leader of the German desk formed the Soviet 
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negotiating position as ifthe Federal Republic were a country where 
aggressive monopolies were about to oppress small-scale capitalism, where 
political persecution was commonplace, and where foreign troops ruled the 
country and exploited the population by way of trade. Due to these 
perceptions, any bargaining between Moscow and the Western powers about a 
German peace treaty could easily have turned out to be somewhat absurd. 
What the Western powers would consider a Soviet concession, Moscow 
would consider a demand- and vice versa. 
Ironically, Gribanov's thoroughly hostile and negative view of the West 
emboldened him to plan a peace treaty that might have been acceptable to a 
majority of the West Germans on most issues. When Gribanov wrote about 
the need to secure political freedoms in a united Germany, for example, he 
did not think of this as a surrender, but rather a prerequisite. Moscow, we 
must remember, exaggerated Adenauer's repression of the Communists. 
When Gribanov insisted on the rights of man in Germany, he did so in the 
belief that Adenauer could not militarise the country without violating these 
freedoms. 
Likewise, when Moscow insisted that a united Germany be allowed to trade 
freely, the Soviet diplomats acted on a beliefthat trade in Western Europe was 
forced, not free, and distorted to serve the political purpose of arming the 
Atlantic alliance.ln this perspective, the demand that a united Germany should 
practice free trade was not a Soviet concession, but a Soviet demand. By 
insisting on free trade, Gribanov thought he was dealing a blow to the 
American exploitation ofWestern Germany; he sincerely believed that 
Germany, when liberated from the American occupation troops and their 
proteges, wouldjustas readily trade with the Soviet Union as the West 
Germans presently did with the United States. 
The economic provisions in the two peace treaty drafts cannot be fully 
understood without taking into account the Soviet idea of how a capitalist 
economy develops. If monopolies were left unconstrained, they would again 
breed imperialism,revanchism, militarism and war- as they had done twice 
before. Since Soviet diplomats believed that fascism presupposes monopolies 
as a child presupposes a mother, Gribanov hoped the destruction of all German 
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monopolies would prevent a nazi resurrection in the future. The need to avoid 
a new security threat againstthe Soviet Union, not any desire to assistthe 
incompetent West German Communists, explains the various proposals in the 
peace treaty drafts that call for democratisation of the German economy. 
Likewise, on a few occasions Selianinov and Gribanov mentioned the need for 
economic redistribution, but their goal was not to create a Socialist society, 
but to prevent social discontent, particularly among the settlers that had fled 
from Eastern Europe. Such discontent, Moscow reasoned, could provoke 
revanchism. 
The Stalin note vs. the actual Soviet bargaining position 
Selianinov' streaty text and Gribanov' s schematic draft of the foundations for a 
peace treaty with Germany both aimed to sketch the Soviet position in 
possible negotiations with the Western powers. Being ordinary diplomats, 
neither Selianinov nor Gribanov could afford to be generous on behalf of the 
Soviet Union. Their suggestions, were therefore likely to resemble the Soviet 
maximum position on a German peace treaty. 
If we compare the Soviet peace treaty aspirations with the suggestions 
in the Soviet note of I 0 March 1952, we find that the Stalin note was rife with 
omissions, but not with lies. In a hypothetical bargaining situation, Moscow 
might have accepted a united, capitalist and non·communistGermany. 
Moscow did not, however, intend to give the German state much sovereignty. 
Selianinovand Gribanovplanned the return of war reparations, the dismantling 
of industries and great power privileges. For the West Germans, the peace 
treaty regime would resemble the occupation regime 1945-49, albeit without 
the presence of occupation troops. 
The numerous restraints that Moscow hoped to place upon Germany 
confirm that the Soviet Union expected the future regime in Germany to 
resemble a bourgeois democracy. These restraints must mean that Mos-
cow viewed a united Germany as a potential enemy rather than a potential 
ally. If given a free hand in Germany, the Russians would not hesitate to 
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introduce socialism - but the Soviet hand in Germany was forced, not free. 
Unable to obtain an ideal solution, the Soviet priority was to prevent a 
future German military threat, not to expand the East German model to 
Western Germany; the Soviet appetite for socialism, could not subdue the fear 
of German militarism. Hence, the peace treaty provisions that aimed to 
prevent Nazism were many and absolute, and the suggestions that could 
impose socialism from above were few and vague. The need to contain 
Germany, not socialism through Machiavellian tactics, explain the contents of 
Gribanov' sand Selianinov' s texts. 
On a number of occasions, the German desk used the peace treaty with 
Italy as a model for its work. Italy, like Germany, had a prehistory of 
fascism. In 1947, the great powers signed a peace treaty with Italy that 
guaranteed political freedoms and ended the Western occupation of that 
country - whereupon Communism prospered. Possibly, Soviet diplomats 
hoped the development in Germany would resemble the developmentin Italy. 
At least, the peace treaty schemes contained a number ofliberal guarantees 
that would allow the German Communist party to grow, prosper and prevail-
when the forces ofhistory permitted. The German desk did not, however, care 
to secure the Communists any prominent role in German politics, for example 
by imposingcoalitiongovernmentsupona united Germany. 
The internal planning work in the Soviet foreign ministry was broadly in 
agreement with the Stalin note. Both the Stalin note and the Soviet peace 
treaty schemes explicitly forbade the presence of foreign troops. Germany 
was to be neutral, and lightly armed. On this point, the various internal papers 
vary somewhat. The treaty text prepared by Selianinovpropose only a German 
police force with hand guns. Gribanov' sschematicdraft allowed Germany 
armed forces with a strength roughly equal to those ofltaly. With regard to 
economic principles, the internal papers confirm that Moscow was ready to 
accept a capitalist model for a united Germany. The German economy, 
however, would be restrained by war reparations. A wide range of products 
would be banned, and three control commissions would retain far-reaching 
authority. 
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Conclusions: Two tracks of Soviet 
foreign policy 
Atthe onset of the cold war, the United States stopped treating West Gennany 
as a foe and began to look at the country as an ally. At least from 1947, 
Washington aimed to revitalise the Gennaneconomy. Two years later, in 
1949, the three Western zones of occupation were granted statehood and 
became the Federal Republic ofGennany. Still, West Gennany was no 
ordinary country. Bonn had no army, and the occupation powers enjoyed 
vaguely defined, but essentially limitless, privileges.ln legal tenns, the 
Federal Republic was occupied territory. 
Then, in the aftennath of the North Korean attack on South Korea the 
' 
Western powers agreed to let the Federal Republic rearm and prepared to 
make the country a regular member of the Atlantic Alliance. In return for 
Bonn' s co-operation, the Western powers agreed to lift the remaining 
restrictions on West Gennan heavy industry and grant the Federal Republic 
full sovereignty - within the framework of European integration. These 
developments would inevitably undo the Potsdam agreement and with it the 
Soviet Union's hope for war reparations. Worse, Gennan soldiers would 
again confront the Red Anny. 
The urgency that Soviet observers felt about Gennany is explained, not 
by facts alone, but by the distorted lens through which Moscow observed 
the developments in the Federal Republic. Moscow saw the Gennan 
economic miracle as part of an arms build-up, and Soviet diplomats were 
convinced that the monopolistic Ruhr industries carried the seeds of 
revanchism, fascism and imperialism. Besides, the European integration 
process allegedly gave the United States direct control over many aspects 
of West Gennan society. 
In responding to the danger of Gennan soldiers, the Soviet Union pursued 
two different strategies. One was advocated by Soviet diplomacy and involved 
92 DEFENCE STI.IDIES 1/1998 
L 
some kind of understanding with the Western powers; the other was 
spearheaded by East Gennan Communists, embraced the Sovietisationofthe 
Eastern zone and the struggle against Bonn and the Western powers. Stalin 
wavered between the two strategies; he failed to co-ordinate different policy 
initiatives and left confusion and disarray. 
Detour Palais Rose 
When first confronted with the danger of Gennan soldiers, Moscow's 
response was to demand that the great powers maintain status quo in 
Gennany and refrain from arming the country. Moscow wasted the winter 
of 1950 and the spring of 1951 with one long, head-on attack against a 
future Gennan army. At the Palais Rose Conference (March-June 1951), 
Moscow challenged the Western powers to respect the Potsdam agree-
ment; meanwhile, East Berlin arranged meetings and collected signatures 
against remilitarisation. 
The Soviet strategy backfired. Although there was indeed discontent 
with rearmament both in the Federal Republic and among America's 
European allies, Moscow failed to exploit the opportunities. Rather, the 
direct and aggressive Soviet approach served to convince the Western 
powers about the need to rearm Gennany. 
Moscow considers unification and a treaty on Germany 
The failure of the Palais Rose Conference brought about a shift in Soviet 
strategy. In the summer of 1951, as the Western powers moved undeterred 
to establish a European army and grant the Federal Republic sovereignty, 
the Gennan desk proposed that the Soviet Union, irrespective of what the 
other great powers aimed to do, should elaborate the text of a peace treaty 
with Gennany, excite the West Gennan public and enter negotiations with 
the Western powers on how to solve the Gennan problem. 
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Within the Soviet foreign ministry, Gribanov and the German desk were 
responsible for administering Soviet relations with the Western powers 
over Germany. Although Gribanov worked in a minefield of conflicting 
interests, his work showed a surprising consequence; he repeatedly tried to 
convince his superiors that a peace treaty with Germany could solve the Soviet 
Union's problems. The German desk continued to employ the logic of the 
Potsdam agreement and sought co-operation among the great powers to keep 
Germany down. 
In advocating a peace treaty, Gribanov sought security, not revolution. His 
department, the German desk, produced a couple of unfinished peace treaty 
drafts that reveal how Soviet diplomats aimed to secure iron-clad guarantees 
against a Nazi revival and German militarism. The plans did not, however, 
include any strategy to place Communists in political positions or secure state 
ownership of German industries. Gribanovused Italy rather then the GDR as 
model for a united Germany, and he hoped to impose on Germany the same 
kind of punitive clauses thatthe wartime Allies had placed on Italy in 1947. 
Furthermore, Gribanov hoped to secure high war reparations, German non-
alignment and far-reaching privileges for the four great powers. The foreseen 
regime to keep Germany demilitarised under supervision by a control 
commission would strictly limit German sovereignty. 
To avoid unnecessary opposition in the West against negotiations, the 
foreign ministry decided to launch, not the full text of a peace treaty, but a 
document called ''the foundations for a peace treaty with Germany". This 
document has since become known as the Stalin note of I 0 March 1952. 
The note reflected the Soviet idea of a peace treaty, but presumably unpopular 
suggestions about war reparations and four-powerprivileges in a united 
Germany were removed. 
In the fall ofl951, the Politburo approved ofGribanov' s peace treaty 
strategy, but not without second thoughts. The Kremlin was haunted by 
the hard and unyielding Soviet strategy at the Palais Rose. For fearthatthe 
Western powers would interpret a new Soviet peace treaty proposal as a 
retreat and, consequently, a sign of weakness, the Politburo ordered a broad 
public campaign in Germany. The purpose of this campaign was to create a 
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demand in the West German population fornegotiations with Moscow. When 
this demand was sufficiently strong, the Soviet Union could offer to discuss a 
peace treaty, and the move would appear, not as a retreat in the face of a 
determined Western policy, but as a generous Soviet concession to the 
German people. 
Waiter Ulbricht's mutiny 
On Moscow's orders, the East German Communists spent the autumn of 1951 
trying to tempt Adenauerto join in the plea for a peace treaty. East Berlin had 
standing orders to behave in a conciliatoryway, avoid confrontationand stage 
the broadest possible German appeal for a peace treaty. Time and again, the 
SED leadershipcourtedBonn- only to be rejected by Adenauer. By January 
1952, Ulbricht ran out of patience and proposed a change in tactics: he wanted 
to attack the Adenauer regime and the General Agreement. Ulbricht preferred 
to use the peace treaty as a battle cry. His hopes were to unite the national idea 
with the idea of socialism, and help spread the East German model of society 
toallofGermany. 
Waiter Ulbricht was a man of tremendous zeal. Having escaped Hitler's 
persecution, he fled to Moscow, and - as one of not to many exiled Commu-
nists, he escaped Stalin's purges as well. His life was a long stubborn fight for 
revolution, the Soviet Union and Communism.'54 Ulbrichtmighthave hoped 
for unification, and many SED officials indeed believed in unification well 
into the 1960s, '"but he never mixed his priorities: national unity was only 
Ulbricht's second priority, socialism his first. Like Colonel Tiulpanov before 
him, who ran the political life in the Soviet Zone of Occupation until 1949, 
Ulbricht anticipated the division of Germany and acted upon it.'" Later in life, 
he spearheaded the construction ofthe Berlin wall and built "socialism in half 
a country". 357 
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Two lines of policy collide 
Occasionally, Ulbricht's policies conflicted with the intentions ofhis Soviet 
masters. The memoirs ofVladimir Semenov, for example, confirm that the 
SED general secretary pushed for socialism and that the Soviet foreign 
ministry tried to restrain him."' This study, as well, has touched several 
internal disputes that occurred as Waiter Ulbricht stepped onto the turf of 
Mikhail Gribanov and the Soviet foreign ministry. 
A first controversy was caused by the East German attempts to widen their 
field of competence. In their eagerness to help Moscow, the SED leaders-
consciously or not- preferred actions that added to the sovereignty and 
prestige ofEast Berlin. In the autumn of 1950, for example, Dertinger 
proposed calling a conference ofSoviet-bloc foreign ministers (the Prague 
Conference) not least because his government needed recognition and a place 
to show the flag. 
The Soviet foreign ministry, on the other hand, carefully guarded the 
Potsdam agreement. The German desk opposed the East German attempts 
to enter parts of the field where only great powers should tread. When East 
Berlin proposed to undo this or the other part of the Potsdam agreement, 
the German desk reacted strongly- sometimes leaving the impression that 
Soviet diplomats identified themselves with the Allies of the Second World 
War rather than with their Communist brethren in East Berlin. Indeed, a 
Russian historian, Aleksei Filitov, sees the Stalin note as a Soviet effort to 
frighten the GDR establishment and make sure they stayed loyal to Moscow."' 
Control in the Eastern zone was certainly a Soviet objective, but not the only 
one .. 
A second disagreement between the German desk and East Berlin 
concerned which tactics to apply against German militarisation. The Soviet 
foreign ministry hoped to solve Moscow's troubles by way of.diplomacy; 
the SED hoped to confront the West with manifestations and campaigns. 
Ulbricht and Gribanov were different personalities. Individual conviction 
may have played a role in their choice of tactics, but we may as well point 
at institutional factors. Bureaucracies everywhere, in East Berlin, Washington 
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orin the Soviet foreign ministry, strive to be useful; they fightto justify their 
existence and invent roles for themselves in the process."" Diplomats become 
believers in diplomacy, propagandists in propaganda. 
Frequently, however, the task of a bureaucracy will also affect its outlook: 
where you stand depends on where you sit. Thus, Ulbrichtand Gribanov 
differed, not only in their choice of means, but also in their preferred ends. 
Considering the conditions for German unification, the German desk would 
let the Germans choose whichever governmentthey wanted as long as they 
were unable to take up arms against Moscow or support the war machine of 
the Atlantic Alliance. This strategy allowed for German unification, capitalist 
bourgeois democracy and competitive capitalism. 
Ulbricht'sapproach was rather more ambitious on behalf of the Soviet 
Union. He pushed to extend the East German model of society on to the 
Federal Republic. For Ulbricht, the Stalin note was merely a battle cry in a 
popular fight for unification under socialism. In his proposed keynote 
speech for the Second SED Party Conference, Ulbricht, in no uncertain 
words, described the GDR as a model for all of Germany. Gribanov 
reacted angrily, claiming that the SED general secretary behaved as if "the 
existing division of Germany will continue for ever"."' Apparently, the 
German desk suspected East Berlin of sabotering the Soviet unification 
attempt. 
Stalin did not side with Gribanov or with Ulbricht. The Soviet strategy 
allowed both negotiations with the West and a propaganda campaign. In 
April 1952, however, when the Western powers rejected the Stalin note, 
and negotiations ceased to be an option, Moscow adopted Ulbricht' s 
strategy. The East German Communists should no longer seek solutions 
that resembled the order in other parts of Germany, but demolish the old 
order and build socialism. The Soviet foreign ministry abandoned the idea 
of a peace treaty, and during the last year of Stalin's reign, there was no 
Soviet initiative for a peace treaty. 362 
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Totalitarian rationality reconsidered 
Until recently the dominant picture of Soviet decision-making showed Stalin 
on top of a huge pyramid, issuing orders and recommendations to all his 
subjects so that each part of the Soviet empire would work in coherence with 
the rest."' Most of these previous studies· applied a high degree of rationality 
to the Soviet decision-making system."' The implicit assumption in those 
works was that Stalin knew what he wanted and how best to achieve his goals. 
The opening ofRussian archives dealt a blow to the image of rationality in 
Stalin's foreign policy.lt appeared the dictator was not a good genius, nor an 
evil genius, but rather a mortal man with flawed assessments and spectacular 
faults of judgement. Still Stalin was the undisputed ruler and historians keep 
pointing at Stalin's personality, for example his notorious feeling of 
insecurity, in order to explain Soviet conduct."' Hence, the new image of 
Soviet foreign policy still depicts Moscow as a unitary actor, albeit one that 
frequently, and sometimes irrationally, changed directions to keep up with 
Stalin's whims. 
There is no reason to question Stalin's powers. Such was Stalin's 
standing that German Communists turned to him for counsel even on trivial 
questions. Vladimir Semenov recalled in his memoirs how GDR President 
Pieck asked for Stalin's advice on whether it was permissible for Otto 
Grotewohl to divorce his estranged wife and marry his secretary. Pieck 
insisted on Stalin's opinion - and he got it. Grotewohl was divorced with 
Stalin's blessing.366 Gribanov, like the East German Communists, had no 
higher aim than to please Stalin. 
Here is the riddle: Both Gribanov and Ulbricht advocated clearcut and 
sometimes diametrically opposite opinions about what to do in Germany. If 
either had suspected that Stalin sided with the other, neither would have 
~tu~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Ulbrichtmust have believed they !\Cted in accordance with Stalin's wishes, is 
better evidence of Stalin's ambiguity than the few documents that point to 
debates and disagreements in the Politburo about the German question. 
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Unlike differences of opinion in a finely tuned Western bureaucracy, the 
totalitarian indecisiveness at the top of the Soviet pyramid of power could 
seriously upset the work of the Soviet foreign minis(ry. The Soviet model 
demanded that a great number of decisions be made at the very highest level. 
Sometimes the Politburo considered issues that most foreign ministries in the 
West would lettheir travel agent resolve, for example the entertainment of a 
visiting trade union delegation. Thus, since the people further down in the 
pyramid of power had limited room for manoeuvring, indecisiveness on the 
top had a number of unforeseen consequences. 
One consequence was simply lack of co-ordination. When Stalin lacked 
time, or failed to make up his mind on an issue, Soviet policy lost coherence. 
With regard to Germany, Stalin failed to issue overall guidelines and to co-
ordinate the policies of different actors. Gribanov and Ulbricht were left to 
fight each other. 
Sometimes, lack of directions from above led to a paralysis ofthe foreign 
policy apparatus. The foreign policy apparatus, led by the timid foreign 
minister, Andrei Vyshinskii, could produce lists of advice without a clearcut 
strategy; Vyshinskii shunnedresponsibilityand preferred to offer a variety of 
opinions for the Politburo to choose from. Even opinionated Soviet 
diplomats, as a rule of thumb, tried only to administer Soviet foreign policy. 
And when the decision-makingwas left in disarray, so were they. 
A third consequence of Stalin's indecisiveness was the disproportionate 
power of precedence in the shaping of Soviet foreign policy. When Stalin 
failed to give directions, Soviet diplomats and East German Communists 
checked what they had done the last time around and continued along that 
path. Gribanov, for example, revised a peace treaty proposal that Molotov 
had made in 194 7. For lack of new directions, Soviet diplomats continued to 
employ the logic of the Potsdam agreement and other policies shaped 
before the cold war broke out and the two German states were established. 
Finally, Stalin's indecisiveness might offer startling influence for those 
lesser figures who dared make up their mind. Even the German Commu-
nists yielded influence with their humble advice. So did the German desk. 
Of dire necessity rather than desire for influence, the German desk elabo-
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rated an overall Soviet policy to fill the vacuum atthe top. However inferior 
Ulbricht and Gribanov might have been, tbey were at least able to come up 
witb opinions. And, regardless of power and standing, those who know 
what they want, invariably enjoy an advantage compared to those who do 
not. 
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Appendix on sources 
Printed sources 
Diplomaticheskii slovar v trekh tomakh [Diplomatic dictionary in three 
volumes], A.A. Gromyko, A. G. Kovalev, P.P. Sevostianov and S.L. Tikhvinskii 
(eds.),Moscow:Nauka, 1984. 
Documents on German Unity, volumes I and 11, Frankfurt: Office of the 
United States High Commissioner for Germany, 1951-1952. 
For a democratic peace with Germany: speeches and statements by V.M 
Molotov, minister for foreign affairs of the USSR, made at the London 
session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 25 - December 15, 
1947, London: Soviet News, 1948. 
Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], Washington D.C., Govern-
ment Printing Office. 
The Soviet Union and the question of the unity of Germany and the 
German peace treaty, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1952. 
Treaties and international agreements registered or filed and recorded with 
the Secretariat of the United Nations, New York, 1945-
Wilhelm Pieck: Aufteichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953, R. 
Badstlibner and W. Loth (eds.), Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994. 
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Archival sources 
AVPRF- Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Foreign Policy 
Archives of the Russian Federation) 
RTsKhiDNI- Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i lzucheniia Dokumentov 
Noveishei Istorii (Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Docu-
ments of Contemporary History) 
TsKhSD - Tsentr Khraneniia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (Storage Centre 
for Contemporary Documentation) 
GARF- Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archives of 
the Russian Federation) 
OntheAVPRF 
This study relies heavily on materials from the Foreign Policy Archives of 
the Russian Federation (AVPRF). Unlike diplomatic archives elsewhere, the 
A VPRF was never intended to support researchers, but rather serve the 
~eeds of ministry officials. In-house archivists (fondakhraniteli) used to 
do all the work in the archives. Only recently, through the work of the Interna-
tional Archives Advisory Group and the International Archives Support 
Fund,'has the AVPRF acquired a reading room, Xerox machines and a 
structure that allows independent research. Gradually, the A VPRF has been 
transformed into an accessible archive. Those who are willing to spend 
some time in Moscow, and show some serious interest in the archive and 
its staff, will eventually overcome the difficulties. 
To identify relevant collections (fondy) of files in the AVPRF, a re-
searcher will need to know which branch of the foreign ministry carried 
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responsibility for a particular policy. Most basic work took place in geo-
graphic offices, 1st European, 2nd European, etc. Each geographic office 
dealt with a region, but documents were stored according to country. In 
our period (1950-1952) the archives treated Germany as one single entity 
and kept files about the GDR and the Federal Republic in the same country 
series (Referentura po Germanii). The country series are obvious places to 
start a search since they usually contain the most extensive holdings on any 
given issue. AVPRF collections of this kind were divided in two sub-
collections, one more secret, the other less secret. To tell the collections 
apart, the number of the more secret collection was preceded by a zero; 
thus,Jond 082 contains secret material about Germany and fond 82 
contains less secret materials. 
If a question gained in importance, a deputy foreign minister, or the 
foreign minister himself, would eventually guide and censor the drafting of 
initiatives. Thus, materials on the Stalin note are also present in the collec-
tions of three central deputy foreign ministers and the foreign minister 
himself: Sekretariat A./a. Bogomolova (fond 019), Sekretariat V.A. Zorina 
(fond 021), Sekretariat A.A. Gromyko (fond 022) and Sekretariat A./a. 
Vyshinskogo (fond 07). 
The Soviet foreign ministry was a strict hierarchy. The co-ordinating 
functions rested with the minister and his deputies. The General secretariat 
(fond 029) handled some central functions such as archives and personnel 
administration. Besides, work in the Department of Treaties and Interna-
tional Law (MezJuiunarodno-pravovoe upravlenie- fond 054) and in the 
Department of Economics (fond 046) would necessarily affect policy in 
several countries. The collections of these central offices have not been 
subject to systematic declassification, and the researcher will have to 
inquire about materials for specific cases. According to AVPRF archivists, 
the files of the Department of Treaties and International Law contain 
additional materials about the German peace treaty. I have only been given 
access to the non-secret collection of this directorate (fond 54). 
The most pressing problem with work in the AVPRF is how to select 
materials from a given collection. The in-house archivists relied on a 
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systematic but inflexible regime. For any given year, they would create an 
inventory list (opis) that listed every file (delo) in a given collection !fond). 
These inventories (opisi) list classified and declassified information alike, 
and are generally not shown to researchers. To make proper use of the 
inventories, a researcher should also he familiar with the hierarchy of index 
numbers that helps identify the subject of a particular file. When given due 
notice, the AVPRF may produce inventory lists without references to 
classified materials. I have only been able to use opisi from Gromyko's and 
Zorin 's collections. 
The absence of concise finding aids in the AVPRF leaves a certain 
disarray about what materials that remains classified. The problem is 
aggravated because documents are stored in bound and sealed volumes; 
since a single document with classified information cannot he removed 
from the file, the presence of one single piece of classified information may 
force the archive to withhold the whole file. Similarly, most intelligence 
reports remain classified since there is no way of deleting a single para-
graph of sensitive material. Thus, most of the concise political reports 
produced annually by Soviet embassies (godovye otchety) remain classi-
fied. 
Another broad category of classified materials is the huge collection of 
telegrams that .were sent in a ciphered code !fond 059). The foreign 
ministry decoded the ciphered messages and produced a single copy of the 
text. The fragile condition of the paper, and the fact that access to such 
telegrams might, in theory at least, help break the original code, continue to 
impede declassification. Large portions of documents about Germany remain 
inaccessible because materials from military institutions like the Soviet 
Control Commission in Germany !fond 0451) are exempt from ordinary 
declassification. 367 
A researcher in the AVPRF would be wise to develop strategies to 
compensate for missing finding aids and classified materials. One alterna-
tive is to broaden the request for materials. For 1951 and 1952, I have 
requested every sequence of files in the Referentura po Germanii where 
·political materials - widely defined - might be stored. I have made numer-
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ous specific, rather than few and sweeping, requests. Furthermore, I have 
compared the contents of the more accessible deputy foreign ministers' 
files with the picture that emerges from the larger, but less accessible, 
Referentura po Germanii. (Allegedly, some 95 per cent of the files in 
Molotov's and Vyshinskii's collections are now open to research). After 
three consecutive visits to the AVPRF, each stay lasting four to six weeks, 
I have become less mystified. That, in the end, is the only way I can prove 
I have seen a sufficiently broad selection of materials. 
To compensate the shortcomings of the AVPRF, one may also make use 
of materials from the Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of 
Documents of Contemporary History (RTsKhiDNI). The RTsKhiDNI holds 
the files of the Communist Party's Central Committee from the years prior 
to 1953, including the files of the Central Committee's International Com-
mission (Vneshnepoliticheskaia Komissiia- fond 11, opisi 127 and 138). 
This body received full reports on the political sentiments in Germany, on 
campaign activities and Communist party activities. The Politburo protocol 
is available on microfiche in the RTsKhiDNI. Although this protocol may 
reveal when a particular matter was discussed, most foreign policy resolu-
tions are stored in special files (osobye papki) that frequently remain 
classified as of October 1996. Besides, the Politburo did not take minutes 
during Stalin's last years.'" Lots of questions are thus likely to remain 
unanswered. 
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176 AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 44, I. 32, SCC memo on laws and other 
measueres from the Bundestag and the Bonn government in order to lower the 
standard of living and destroy the last traces of democratic freedom, Bakulin to 
llichev and Gribanov, 20July 1951. 
m AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 17, d. 120, ll. 11-12, 3EO memo on the development 
of a German movement in favour of peace and against remilitarisation, 31 July 
1951. 
178 AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, ll. 2, 15-16, SCC memo on prepara-
tion for the referendum in Western Germany, Bushmanov, 11 May 1951. 
179 AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 44, I. 20, SCC memo on German elections, 
Buscmanov and Bakulin to Kudriavtsev, 11 May 1951. 
1ao Quote from W. Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind: Warum Moskau die DDR 
nicht wollte, Berlin: 1994, pp.170-171. For information regarding the referendum 
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, campaign, see AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108,ll. 1-16, SCC memo on 
preparation for referendum, Bushmanov, 11 May 1951; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, 
p. 233, d. 68,ll. 19-43, MID memo on the National Front, Kudriavtsev to 
Kabin, 2 Aprill951; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 229, d. 39,ll. 29-33, SED plan 
on conduction of referendum in Berlin, SED to German desk, 14 May 1951. 
181 AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108,ll. 128-133, 3EO memo on possible 
measures with regard to the situation in Western Germany, Gribanov to 
Gromyko, Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev and Bogomolov, 9 July 1951. 
182 Documents on German Unity, vol. I, p. 148, declaration of the German federal 
government on all-German elections, 22 March 1950. 
183 Documents on German Unity, vol. I, pp. 158-162, Prague Declaration of 
Soviet bloc foreign ministers, 22 October 1950. 
1
" See W. Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind ... , pp. 168 ff. 
"' FRUS, 1951, vol.IIJ, part 2, p. 1766, the chancellor of the Federal Republic 
(Adenauer) to the chairman of the Allied High Commission for Germany 
(Francois Ponl'et), 9 March 1951. 
"' AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 44,11. 1-3, 3EO memo on Adenauer's 
declaration in the Boon parliament, Kudriavtsev to Zorin, 12 March 1951. 
187 All citations from AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108,1. 129, 3EO memo 
on possible measures regarding the situation in Western Germany, Gribanov to 
Gromyko, Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev, Bogomolov and Lavrentiev, 9 July 1951. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
1
"' AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108,ll. 126-134, 3EOmemoonpossible 
measures regarding the situation in Western Germany, Gribanov to Gromyko, 
Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev, Bogomolov and Lavrent'ev, 9 July 1951. 
191 Ibid. 
"' "Besprechung am 30. 7. 1951, abends 8 Uhr, in Karlshorst, 30 July 1951" in 
R. Badstubner and W. Loth (eds.), Wilhebn Pieck: Aufteichnungen zur 
Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953, Berlin: 1994, pp. 371-373. 
"' AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108,1. 160, draft of memo to Stalin, draft of 
note to the three powers on German remilitarisation, and draft of note to France on 
the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan, Gribanov to Gromyko, 9 August 1951. 
1
., Ibid. For a report on the KPD conference, see RrsKhiDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 
669,11.44-52, SCC memo on conference for KPD workers, Bakulin to Grigorian, 7 
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September 1951. 
~~ "Besprechung am 30. 7. 1951 ... " in Wiliam Pieck: Aufzeichnungen ... The cited 
paragraph reads: "Gmtewohl/ - Initiativ frtiher bei uns - bis zur I Abstimmung I 
jetzt beim Gegner I neuer Programmpunkt Friedensyertrag 1951 lnhalt I Remilit. 
mit Krieg -I Kriegszustand beenden I Gleichberechtigung in Remilitarisierung" 
(p.373). 
"' AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47,1. 14, on the wish ofPieck, Grothewohl 
and Ulbricht that the USSR government make a concrete suggestion to conclude a 
peace treaty with Germany, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 15 August 1951. 
"" "Besprechung am 30. 7. 1951..." in Wiliam Pieck: Auft.eichnungen ... The fu11 
text reads: "!l1ID::kbl: /Was tun dagegen? - bisher mehr Entlarvunglmehr Molotow 
-I Londoner Konferenz Volkskammer IJmmn Friedensvertrag gegen Wehrvereine 
I Wie Massen versti!ndlich -/daB Soviet Union Frieden, USA Krieg will-/ 
Westen sagt- ffir Frieden, gegen Agression/ Soviet Union" (p. 372). 
198 Molotov's memoirs confirm that the foreign minstry was allowed only 
limited room of discretion, see Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: iz dnevnika F. 
Chueva, F. Chuev (ed.), Moscow 1990, p. 95. 
'" AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47,11. 12-13, proposal to establish a 
commission to elaborate the foundations of a peace treaty with Germany, 
Gribanov to Gromyko, 3 August 1951. 
""AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108,11. 157-172, draft of a memo to Stalin, 
draft of a note to the three powers on German remilitarisation, and draft of a 
note to France on the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan, Gribanov to Gromyko, 
9 August 1951. 
"' RTsKhiDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1089, Politburo resolution no. 439 on 
Vyshinskii's medical leave, 11 July 1951; AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 33, d. 388,11. 
67-86, draft of action plan concerning Germany, Semenov and Gribanov to 
Vyshinskii, 20 August 1951. The plan was "revised in accordance with your 
[Vyshinskii's] remarks" (p. 67). 
zoz On the parallel between Vyshinskii's actions as procurator and his style as 
foreign minister, see V. Israelian, "Oblichitel"' [Denouncer] in Inkvisitor: 
stalinsldi prokuror Vyshinshinskii, [The inquisitor: Stalin's prosecutor Vyshinskii], 
Moscow: 1992, pp. 288-296. Gromyko's contribution in this unflattering biography 
is also readable, see A.A. Gromyko, "'Zagadka' Vyshinskii" [The Vyshinskii 
'enigma'] in ibid., pp. 296-305. 
2lll AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 33, d. 388,11.67-86, draft of action planconcerrting 
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Gennany, Semenov and Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 20 August 1951. 
""Ibid. 
""RTsKhiDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1090, Politburo resolution no. 259 to rework the 
30 July proposal ofPieck, Ulbricht and Grotewohl, 27 August 1951. The quote 
reads: "Bonpoc 0 fepMaHHH. IlopyliHTh T. BLIIiDIHCKOMY B 3-JIHCBHHJ;i CpOK Ha 
ocuose o6Meua MHemrB nepepa6oTaTb npencTaBJieHHbiB npoeKT, KM eH B BUllY 
Bbipa6oTaTb npeli.IlO&eHHSI no BODpOCaM, OOCTaBJieHHbiM TT. IlHKaM, 
Ynb6pHXTOM H fpOTesonoM 8 6ecene c qyiiKOBhlM n J1m.nqeBhlM ... " 
"" AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 4 7 ,I. 20, renewed proposal to let a commis-
sion prepare draft of peace treaty with Gennany, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 27 
August 1951. Bogomolov's copy of the document is stored in AVPRF, f. 019, 
op. 2, p. 17, d. 123,1. I. The reference in G. Wettig, "Die Deutschland-Note auf 
Basis dip1omatischer Akten ... ", p. 793 (footnote 22), is, however, incorrect. 
207 S.A. Golunskii was head of the foreign ministry's Department of Treaties and 
International Law; S.B. Krylov was a Soviet judge on the International Court and 
expert on the United Nations; V.M. Khvostov headed both the international 
relations department at the Academy of Science and the foreign ministry 
archives, see A.A. Gromyko, A.G. Kovalev, P.P. Sevostianov and S.L. 
Tikhvinskii (eds.), Diplomaticheskii slovar v trekh tomakh, [Diplomatic 
dictionary in three volumes], Moscow: 1984. 
""AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47,1. 20, renewed proposal to let a commis-
sion prepare draft ... 
""AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 222, d. 13,11. 1-9, draft of report to the Instances 
on proposal to conclude a peace treaty with Gennany and draft of orders to the 
SCC, Semenov, Gribanov and Pushkin to Vyshinskii, 28 August 1951. The 
proposals in this document were based on Politburo directions, and there is not 
likely to have been any major discrepancies between what the troika suggested 
and what the Politburo approved, most likely on a meeting 8 September 1951. 
On this date, ''the Gennan question" was discussed as issue no. 452 on the 
Politburo's agenda, see RTsKhiDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1090 .. 
2
" AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 222, d. 13,1. 2, draft of report to the Instances .... 
The full quote reads: "YK83aHHOe nperulO&eHHe ueMeUKHx npyJeH, no MHeHHJO 
MJ1,ll CCCP, SIBIUieTCSI 8 npuuuune npaBHllbHhlM. Ony6nHKOBaHHe 
cooeTcxoro npoeKTa ocuoo MHpHoro norosopa c fepMaHHeii nano 6hl 
KOHKpeTHYIO nnanpopMy 6opb6b1 3a ermHyiO fepMaHHIO H DpOTHB 
3aKa6aneHHSI 3ananuoit fepMaHHH aurnO-aMepHKaHCKHM HMDCpHaJIHCTaM. 
OnuaKo, B03HHKaeT sonpoc o speMeun u c:popMe TaKoro Bhlcrynneuua: 
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Co8eTCKoro llpaBHTenbCTBa." 
211 AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 222, d. 13,1. 2, draft of report to the Instances ... 
The full quote reads: "MH.ll CCCP ctDITaeT, lfi'O BbiCTJIIJleHHe CoseTCKOro 
IIprunrrenLCTBa B uaCTOBm:mt MOMefiT no sonpocy o MHpHOM noroBOpe c 
fepMaHHeil Morno 6hl co3nan sne'fllaTneHHe, qTo CoseTcxoe IlpaBHTenCTBo 
8 OTJIHqHe OT D03HUHH CoBeTCKOii neneraUHH Ha npensapHTenbHOM 
COBeiiUlHHH 8 flapn&e M8pT-HIOHb 1951r. Dpeli.IlaraeT Tenepb C03B8Tb 
ceccHIO CMM.lla li.JlH o6cy nr.n:emt:R TOnbKO onuoro sonpoca o 3aKJJIOqeHHH 
MHpHoro norosopa c fepMaHHeit. no3TOMY BhlCTynneune CoBeTCKOrO 
IIpasHTem.cTBa no 8onpocy o MHJJHOM norosope c fepMauueil 
uenecoo6p83uee cnenaTL uecxonLKO no3nuee, npensapHTenLno nonroTosus 
MHpOBOe 06UlCCTBelnloe MHCHHC K TaKOMY wary CO CTOpoHhl CoBeTCKOro 
Coi03a." 
212 AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 222, d. 13,1. 2, draft of report to the Instances ... 
213 RTsKhiDNI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 1091,11. 2-6, political portraitofPieck, 
Grotewohl, Ulbricht and Fechner, Suslov to Stalin, Molotov and Zhdanov, 25 
January 1947. 
2
" AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 222, d. 13,11. 1-9, draft of report to the Instances ... 
215 All citations from AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108,11. 126-134, 3EO 
memo on possible measures regarding the situation in Western Germany, 
Gribanov to Gromyko, Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev, Bogomolov and Lavrent'ev, 9 
July 1951. 
216 Documents on German Unity, vol. I, pp. 196-201, statement by Grotewohl to 
the People's Chamber, 15 September 1951. 
217 RTsKhiDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1090, Politburo resolution no. 566 approving 
interview with Chuikov about the 15 September proposal of the GDR People's 
Chamber, 19 September 1951. 
218 Documents on German Unity, part I, pp. 208, interview with General Vassilii 
I. Chuikov, chainnan of the Soviet Control Commission, concerning all-German 
eleclions, 20 September 1951. 
219 AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38,p. 230, d.46,11. 28-36, 3EO memo on proposal of the 
GDR People's Chamber to call an all-German Constituent Council, Gribanov, 29 
September 1951. 
2211 RTsKhiDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 642,1. 97, SCC memo on the political situation 
in East-CDU, Kiiatkin toGrigorian and Semenov, 8 December 1951. 
221 Soviet sources confinn that SED was in control, see AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 
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258, d. 35, II. 44-46, 3EO memo on activities by the bloc of anti-fascist and 
democrat parties and organisations in the GDR, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, Pushkin 
and Podtserob, 19 October 1952. 
222 Lemmer informed a US liason officer about the conversation, see FRUS, 
1951, vol. Ill, part 2, pp. 1803-1804, the director of the Berlin element of 
HICOG [high commissioner for Germany] (Lyon) to the Office of the United 
States High Commissioner for Germany at Frankfurt, 29 October 1951; also 
referred in H. Graml, "Die Legende van der verpaten Gelegenheit", 
Vierte/jahresheftfiir Zeitgeschichte, vol. 29 (1981), pp. 311-312. 
223 AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 221, d. 6, II. 47-57, report on conversation with 
Dertinger, Pushkin to Vyshinskii, Gromyko and Gribanov, 19 October 1951; 
AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 221, d. 6,1. 60, annotation on Dertinger's conversation 
with Lemmer, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 27 October 1951. 
224 AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 221, d. 6, I. 64, report on 29 October conversation 
with GDR Foreign Minister Dertinger, Pushkin to Vyshinskii, Gribanov and 
Gromyko, 21 November 1951. 
"'AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 221, d. 6,1. 60, annotation on Dertinger's conversa-
tion ... 
226 H. Graml, ''Die Legende van der verpaten Gelegenheit", Vierteljahresheft fiir 
Zeitgeschichte, vol. 29 (1981), pp. 318-319. 
m Documents on Gennan Unity, part 1, pp. 209-210, statement of government 
policy by Federal Chancellor Dr. Konrad Adenauer in Bundestag, 27 September 
1951. 
228 Documents on German Unity, part 1, p. 211, letter from Federal Chancellor 
Dr. Konrad Adenauer to Allied High Commission concerning all -German 
elections, 4 October 1951. 
22
' Documents on German Unity, part I, pp. 214-216, address by Federal 
Chancellor Dr. Konrad Adenauer in Berlin, 6 October I95I. 
230 Documents on German Unity, part I, p. 2I8, statement of government policy 
by Soviet zone minister Otto Grotewohl to People's Chamber, 10 October I951. 
231 AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239,d. 105,U. 11-12, 3E0memo on the West 
German request for elections throughout Germany under international control, 
Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 8 October 1951. 
m AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 105,ll. 13-15, 3EO memo on the possibility 
of the Gennan question being raised in the UN General Assembly, Gribanov to 
Vyshinskii, 18 October 1951. 
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233 RTsKhlDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1091, Politburo resolution no. 203 on the GDR 
government's position with regard to all-Gennan elections, 3I October I95I. 
The resolution itself is stored in a special file that remains classified, but the 
orders are paraphrased in Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 
1945-1953, pp. 376-378, Besprechung mit Semjonow am I. 11. 51 im Hause 
ab ends I 0 Uhr bei mir, I November I95I. After having received instructions, 
Pieck sent a letter to his West German counterpart, see Documents on German 
Unity, part I, pp. 246,letter from Soviet Zone President Wilhelm Pieck to 
Federal Republic President Dr. Theodor Heuss on all-Gerrnan elections, 2 
November 1951. 
234 Documents on German Unity, part 2, p. 5, statement by Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei I. Vyshinskii before the United Nations General Assembly, 
opposing discussions on tripartite proposal to investigate the conditions for free 
elections throughout Gennany. 
235 AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 15, d. 169,11.4-8, draft of Politburo resolution 
regarding East German response to UN commission on all-Gennan elections, 
Gromyko to Stalin and Politburo, 5 December 1951. 
"'AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 15, d. 169,1. 9, revised draft of Politburo resolution 
regarding East German response to UN commission on all-Gennan elections, 
Gromyko to Molotov, 6 December !951. 
237 AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 15, d. 169,1. 13, copy of Politburo resolution [no 
84/668] on East German response to UN commission on all-Gennan elections, 
Gromyko to Stalin and Politburo, 7 December 1951. This revised resolution text 
was written after the Politburo meeting and reads: "3. B OTBeTe npaBwrem.cTBa 
r,llP, 00 TaK1lf'ICCKHM coo6paR.CHIDIM, He C.JleJlOBaJIO 6hl CCLIJla.TbCH Ha TO, 
lfl'o OOH HeKoMmrreiiTHa o6cy&.na.Th repMaHCKJdt BOnpoc". 
"'AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144,ll. 24, proposal to publish a list with names 
of German and Austrian prisoners of war that remain in the USSR, Gribanov, I6 
January 1952. 
239 E. Scherstjanoi and C. Stappenbeck, '''Dibelius war in Karishorst. .. wollte 
Mittelsmann sein zwischCn SKK und Adenauer ... ': Ein geheimes Gesprllch 
zwischen Bischof Dibelius, Armeegeneral Tschujkow und Politberater Semjonow 
im November 1951", Deutsch/andArchiv, no. 10 (1995), pp. 1031-1047, 
specially, p. 1040. 
""AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47,ll. 35-40, drsft of basic principles for a 
peace treaty with Germany, Gribanov to Bogomolov, !5 September 1951. 
241 Ibid. 
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242 AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 15, d. 168, ll. 1-7, annotated draft of basic principles 
of a peace treaty with Germany [the Stalin note], Vyshinskii's secretariat to 
Molotov, 30 September 1951. The next known copy, where Molotov's 
commenst were heeded, is AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 59-64, draft 
of basic principles for a peace treaty with Germany [the Stalin note], Gribanov 
to Gromyko, 19 October 195I.ldentical copy in AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 15, d. 
168, n. 8-14. 
243 Ibid. In Russian: "llaneKo ne ... ". 
244 When Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin received a copy on 3 December - for 
his eyes only- it was identical with the text from October, AVPRF, f. 082, op. 
38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 50-55, draft of basic principles for a peace treaty with 
Germany [the Stalin note], Gribanov to Zorin, 3 December 1951. 
'" AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 17, d. 123, ll. 2-9, draft ofletter to Stalin on the 
preparing of basic principles for a peace treaty with Germany [the Stalin note], 
Gribanov to Bogomolov, I 0 December 1951. 
"'AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 17, d. 123, I. 7, draft of letter to Stalin ... 
247 AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 22-23, 3EO working paper on 
measures related to the preparing of the foundation for a peace treaty with 
Germany, 16 January 1952. 
243 Documents on Gennan Unity, part 2, p. vii, Ulbricht's address to the All-
German Municipal Working Conference in Dresden, 10 November 1951. 
249 Documents on German Unity, vol. 11, p. 40, resolution on German unity, 
adopted by the People's Chamber on 9 January 1952. People's Chamber 
President Johannes Dieckmann sent the resolution to Bundestag President 
Hermann Ehlers on 10 January 1952. 
250 AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, 11. 10-15, reworked draft of basic 
principles for a peace treaty with Germany [the Stalin note], Pushkin, Koptelov 
and Gribanov to Gromyko, 14 January 1952. (Probably Gromyko's annotated 
copy from a meeting with Molotov.) 
"'AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 71-82, copy of Draft of Politburo 
resolution and copy of letter to Stalin regarding a German peace treaty, Gromyko 
to Stalin, 25 January 1952. 
'"Molotov's instructions were copied onto AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, 
ll. 94-104, annotated copy of Politburo papers concerning the basic principles 
for a peace treaty with Germany, 25 January 1952. Molotov himself had 
probably read a somewhat less refined version, AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 
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11, ll. 7-13, revised draft of basic principles for a peace treaty with Germany and 
revised reply to GDR on campaign against the General Agreement, Gribanov, 25 
January 1952. 
25J AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, ll. 1-6, draft of basic principles for a 
peace treaty with Germany [the Stalin note], Pushkin, Gribanov and Koptelov, 
10 January 1952. 
254 T.A. Schwartz, AmericaS Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Cambridge, MA: 1991, pp. 44,235 ff. 
255 AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 25-37, 3EO draft of letter to Stalin on 
East German initiative regarding a peace treaty with Germany and draft of 
foundations for a peace treaty with Germany [the Stalin note], Gromyko to 
Molotov, 21 January 1952. In the Soviet text, the "General Agreement" was 
deprived of capital letters as a sign of disregard. 
2S6Jbid. Gerhard Wettig makes wide use of this document, but his referrence is 
incorrect, see "Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. Marz 1952 auf der Basis 
diplomatischer Akten ... ", p. 796 (footnote 28). Wettig, furthermore, claims that 
the document is a letter from Gromyko to Stalin. It is not. The place of origin 
was the Gennan desk, which sent the letter to Gromyko who passed it on to 
Molotov. Stalin's name was written on the front page because the final version 
(not this draft) was intended for the Politburo. 
"'AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, I. 27, 3EO draft of letter to Stalin on East 
German initiative ... 
25' AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, I. 27, 3EO draft of letter to Stalin on East 
German initiative ... Note how the foreign ministry used capital letters to pay 
reverence: "Peace Treaty" vs "general agreement" and "bono government". 
"'AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 27-28, 3EO draft ofletter to Stalin on 
East Gennan initiative ... 
""AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, I. 28, 3EO draft ofletter to Stalin on East 
German initiative ... The quote reads: "KpoMe Toro, BbiCT}'IIJleHue CoseTcKoro 
Co103a c noJIHbiM TeKCTOM Mnpnoro norosopa na 6a3e npennoa..eunoro 
HaponuoU: IlanaToU npoeKTa OCHOB 3TOfO llOfOBopa CBJI33fl0 6bl HaM PYKH B 
B03MOH..Hb1X neperosopax c Janilli,HbiMH nepa..asaMH no oTnenbHbiM CTaTbBM 
Mupuoro .llorosopa u nano 6bi noson npOTHBHHKaM Mnpnoro 
yperynnposannB c repManneU ncnonb30BaTb neBblfOJIHble WlH HeMues 
ueKOTOpble cranu norosopa c uenbiO ocna6HTb Juaqeuue uawero 
BbiCTynnennH no 3TOMY sonpocy." 
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"' AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, I. 27, 3EO draft of letter to Stalin on East 
German initiative ... The full quote reads: "CnenyeT TaiC.Y.e HMen. 8 BH.Ily, tJTo 
nonyqeunLDi PYKOBOJlCTBOM r,UP arCHTypHLIM nyreM TCKCT 'Breuepa.JILHOro 
noroaopa.v. BLI3hlBaeT cepLe3HLie coMnemnr s era nonmtuuocrn. He 
HCKJliOliCHO, lfTO 3TOT llOKyMeHT 6LIJI CDCUHaJILHO H3rDTOBJICH B UCIDIX 
JlC3HHc}JopMauHH. " 
"' AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144,1. 29, 3EO draft of letter to Stalin on East 
German initiative ... 
'" AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144,1. 29, 3EO draft of letter to Stalin on East 
German initiative ... The full quote reads: "YKa.Jaunas noTa CoaeTcKoro 
flp3BHTenLCTB3 03H3llaJia 6LI, lfrO KOCBCHHO Mbl npe.llilaraeM C0383Tb CoaeT 
MKHHcTpoB HHocTpaHHbiX .llen "'CTLipex nep.v.aa, OJlH3Ko 6e3 q,opManLnoro 
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peweHHH BOIIpOCa 0 BOCCTaHOBneHHH CllHHCTBa fepMaHHU," 
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'" AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144,11. 71-82, draft of Politburo resolution 
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nus.") 
271 AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144,1. 124, revised draft of Politburo resolution 
on a response to the GDR, Vyshinskii to Molotov, 6 February 1952. 
272 Ibid. 
213 AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144,11. 124-128, revised draft of Politburo 
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277 RTsKhiDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1093, Politburo resolution no. 47 on the sending 
of a note to the United States, England and France with the draft of the founda-
tions for a peace treaty with Gennany, 8 March '1952. 
"'AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144,1. 126, revised draft of Politburo resolu-
tion on a response to the GDR, Vyshinskii to Molotov, 6 February 1952. 
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States, England and France a note with the draft of the foundations for a peace 
treaty with Germany, 8 March I 952. 
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Ulbricht's proposal reads: "B TO 8peMSJ KaK 8 3anarumif repMaHHH B pe3YDbTaTe 
roCIIOJlCTBa KJJYDIIbiX DpOMLIUUieHHbiX MOHOIIOIIuit, 6aHK08 Kpynuoro 
3eMJleBJJ3lleHHSI H CBSI3aHHLIX. C HHMH rocynapCTBeHHLIX lfHHOBIIHKOB He MOd'ieT 
6LITL H pequ 0 JleMOKpaTHqeCKOM CTpOe, B r,llP nyreM IIHKBHJlaUHH 
MOHOIIOJIHCT08, KpynHLIX 3eMJie8113lle.JlLUe8 H lJHCTKH rocannapaTa C03JlaHLI BCe 
OCH081>1 lUISI JleMoKpa'IWICKOro pa3BHTHSI." 
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60JILIIIOit H3.UHOHan&HOit 3aiialJH - C03,Ila.HHe WISI 8Ceii repMaHHH 8 mt:Ue 
repMaHCKOit JleMOKpaTHqecKOit pecny6IIHKH 06pa3Ua pa3BHTHSI JleMOKpaTHH 
H MHpHOro CTpOHTeJILCT8a, npenHBIIBJOT K CouuanucruqecKoU:U: Enuuoii 
napnm repMaunu - aBaurapny uapona - no8biiiieuHble Tpe6oBa.HHH." 
""AVPRF, f. 07, op. 27, p. 43, d. I 72, 11. 56-60, SED's preliminary proposal ... 
291 AVPRF, f. 07, op. 27, p. 43, d. 172, I. 67, annotation on the proposals of the 
SED politburo for the 2nd party conference, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 27 March 
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waren von vomherein zu weitschweifig, als daB sie in dieser Fonn geeignet 
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296 AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, I. 29, schematic draft ... 
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"'A VPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, I. 33, treaty text ... 
303 /bid 
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134 DEFENCE STUDIES 1/1998 
HW'-
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westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956, part 2, Die EVG-Phase, L. KOIIer, 
K.A. Maier, W. Meier-D6mberg and H.E. Volkman ( eds. ), Munich: 1990, pp. 
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321 AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38,p. 231, d. 57, 11. 1-8, 3EO memo on German neutrality .. . 
The anti-neutrality line was allegedly adopted by the 3rd SED Congress, 20-24 July 
1950. 
322 Quotations from AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 231, d. 57, 11. 1-8, 3EO memo on 
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"' A VPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, I. 29, schematic draft ... 
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'" AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, 11.42-43, schematic draft ... 
343 "Wholesale price indexes" in Historical statistics of the United States: 
colonial times to 1970, US Bureau of the Census: Washingtion D.C, 1975, pall I, 
p. 199, table E-23. 
344 West German GDP in dollars, see P. Kennedy, The rise and fall of the great 
powers, New York: 1989, p. 369. Total Marshal! aid, G. Lundestad, Ost, vest, 
nord, sor: hovedlinjer i internasjonal politikk 1945-1995, 3rd edition, Oslo: 
1996, p. 42. 
"' Treaty of peace with Italy, signed 10 February 1947, pall VI, allicles 74-77; 
AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, 11. 32-33, schematic draft ... AVPRF, f. 082, 
op.40, p. 255, d. 11, 11.43-44, treaty text... 
34
' AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, I. 43, treaty text ... 
347 Ibid., 11. 45-46. 
'" AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, I. 34, schematic draft ... ; AVPRF, f. 082, 
op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, I. 45, treaty text ... 
"' AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, I. 45, treaty text ... 
'"Ibid., 11. 37-38. 
"' Ibid., 11. 40-45. 
"' Ibid., I. 46. 
"'A VPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, 11. 24-26,33, schematic draft ... 
'" Ulbricht's role in building the GDR is highlighted in W. Loth, Sta/ins 
ungeliebtes Kind: Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wol/te, Berlin: 1994. 
355 On the strong national sentiment of the SED leadership, see J.A. McAdams, 
.. The GDR oral history project", Cold War International History Project-
bulletin, no. 4 (1994), p. 44. 
3~6 On Tiulpanov's instincts, see N.M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: a 
history of the Soviet zone of occupation, 1945-1949, Cambridge, MA: 1995, p. 
352. 
m D. Staritz paraphrased Stalin's slogan "socialism in one country" in the title of 
his book: Sozialismus in einem ha/ben Lande: Zur Programmatik und Politik 
der KPD/SED in der Phase der antifaschistisch-demokratischen Umwiiltung in 
der DDR. Berlin: 1976. On Ulbricht's role in errecting the wall, see H. Harrison, 
The bargaining powers of weaker allies in bipolarity and crisis: the dynamics of 
Soviet-East German relations, 1953-1961, Ph.D., University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbour, 1994, pp. 139 ff. 
DEFENCE STUDIES 1/1998 137 
,I 
JsR V.S. Semenov, V on Stalin his Gorbatsjow, Berlin: 1995. Fora comment upon 
th~s information, see W. Loth, '"Nicht Sozialismus wardas Ziel", Die Zeit, 30 July 
1995. 
3s9 A. Filitov, Savetskii Soiuz i germanskii vopros v period pozdnego 
stalinizma (k voprosu o genezise "stalinskoi noty'' 10 marta 1952 goda) (The 
Soviet Union and the German question in the period of late Stalinism (On the 
question ahoutthe genesis ofthe"Stalin note" of 10 March 1952)], unpublished 
conference paper, Moscow 1997. Filitov makes extensive use of an early draft of 
this study, S. Bjemstad, Soviet German policy and the Stalin note of 10 March 
1952, Hovedoppgave, University of Oslo, DepartmentofHistory, fall 1996. 
360 P. Selznick, Leadership in administration, New York: 1957. 
"'A VPRF, f. 07, op. 27, p. 43, d. I 72, 11. 66-67, comment on the proposals ofthe 
·SED Politburo for the 2nd party conference, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 27 Marcli 
1952. 
362 After Stalin's death, the Kremlin briefly considered German unity. On the 
insistence of Secret Police ChiefLavrentii Beria, the CentraJ Committee sent 
conciliatory signals to the Western powers and ordered East Berlin to dismantle all 
slogans about socialism. The consequence with which Beria pursued his goal has 
convinced many researchers that the security chiefwas willing to abandon East 
Berlin, see A. Knight, Beria: Stalin 'sfirst lieutenant, Princton: 1993, pp. 176 ff.; 
J. Richter, "Reexamining soviet policy towards Germany during the Beria 
interregnum", Cold War International History Project Working Paper, no. 3 
(1992). The best available account of Soviet German policy after Stalin is probably 
H. Harrison, The bargaining powers of weaker allies in bipolarity and crisis: 
the dynamics ofSuviet-East German relations, 1953-1961, Ph.D., University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbour, I 994. 
363 The most influential of these studies is probably A.B. Ulam, Expansion and 
coexistence: Suvietforeignpolicy, 1917-73, New York: 1971. 
364 For a discussion o~the rationalist approach in Soviet studies, see B.R. Posen, 
"Competing images of the Soviet Union", World Politics, vol. 39 (1987), pp. 
579-597. The ultimate rationalist study is H.J. Morgenthau, In defonse of the 
national interest: a critical examination of American foreign policy, New York: 
1952. Morgenthau covered Soviet policy very briefly, see pp. 5-7, 69-70,241-
242. 
36
' Stalin's insecurity is a basic paradigm in V. Mastny, The cold war and Soviet 
insecurity: the Stalin years, New York: 1996. 
'" V.S. Semenov, V on Stalin bis Gorbatsjow, Berlin: I 995, 27 I -272. 
138 t:EFENCE STUDIES 1/19!18 
367 Two German researchers have made use of a non~secret part of the SCC 
collection (fond 457a) which allegedly contain information on polular Ge~an 
sentiments about a peace treaty in 1952, see E. Scherstjanoi, "Die.DDR ~m. . 
Frilhjahr 1952: Sozialismuslosung und Kollektivierungsbeschluss m s.ow!,et~scher 
Perspektive", Deutschland Archiv, no. 4 (1994), pp. 35~-363; G. Wetttg, Dte 
KPD als Instrument der sowjetischen Deutschland-Pohttk: Festlegungen I 949 und 
Implementierungen I 952", Deutschland Archiv (I 994 ), pp. 8 I 6-829. 
J6B See for example V.S. Semenov, V on Stalin bis Gorbatsjow, Berlin: 1995, P· 
285. 
DEFENCE STUDIES 1/1998 
139 
